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TOIL AND TROUBLE:   
HOW THE ERIE DOCTRINE BECAME 
STRUCTURALLY INCOHERENT  
(AND HOW CONGRESS CAN FIX IT) 
Alan M. Trammell* 
 
The Erie doctrine is still a minefield.  It has long been a source of 
frustration for scholars and students, and recent case law has exacerbated 
the troubles.  Although other scholars have noted and criticized these 
developments, this Article explores a deeper systemic problem that remains 
undeveloped in the literature.  In its present form, the Erie doctrine fails to 
protect any coherent vision of the structural interests that supposedly are at 
its core—federalism, separation of powers, and equality. 
This Article argues that Congress has the power to fix nearly all of these 
problems.  Accordingly, it proposes a novel statute to revamp the Erie 
doctrine in a way that actually protects important structural interests and 
also streamlines the doctrine to make it more easily administrable.  First, 
the statute defines states’ federalism interests with greater precision and 
concomitantly expands federal courts’ power to create rules that are not 
clearly substantive.  Second, it unifies the various strands of the Erie 
doctrine into a single test that serves that vision of federalism.  Finally, 
drawing on lessons from administrative law, the statute gives federal courts 
new discretion as to the means by which they may adopt nonsubstantive 
rules.  The result is a simpler and more coherent Erie doctrine. 
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[I]t is a tale . . . full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the last seventy-five years, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins2 has 
become more than an iconic case.  It is a repository for countless theories of 
federalism,3 separation of powers,4 and even international law.5  Yet the 
modern doctrine, for all of its sound and fury, indeed might signify nothing. 
Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state 
substantive law and federal procedural law.6  That basic dichotomy is 
straightforward.7  The wrinkles and unending trouble for judges, scholars, 
and first-year law students stem from the significant overlap between 
substance and procedure—what Professor Walter Wheeler Cook 
memorably dubbed the “twilight zone.”8  Although the basic framework for 
navigating that twilight zone has been in place for nearly fifty years,9 recent 
cases and scholarship demonstrate that the Erie doctrine has become 
increasingly cumbersome and unpredictable.10 
The problem is actually worse than scholars have appreciated for reasons 
that remain undeveloped in the literature.  In fact, the deficiencies are far 
deeper and more systemic than a convoluted test or a wrongly decided case.  
In its present form, the Erie doctrine is not merely complicated; it is a 
deeply entrenched construct devoid of a guiding principle. 
 
 1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 5. 
 2. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 3. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 
(1974); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964). 
 4. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie—The Thread, 87 HARV. 
L. REV. 1682 (1974); Martin H. Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the 
Interpretive Process:  An “Institutionalist” Perspective, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 761 (1989). 
 5. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law As 
Federal Common Law:  A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
 6. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
 7. This is what some scholars regard as Erie’s narrow holding. See Kevin M. Clermont, 
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2006).  The “Erie megadoctrine,” id. at 50, 
concerns a host of other interesting issues, including the extent to which state courts, when 
applying federal substantive law, must apply certain federal procedures.  Preemption 
questions also fall within the “megadoctrine.”  This Article, however, focuses on the judicial 
choice-of-law issues that have posed many of the most difficult Erie-related questions, 
particularly ones that arise when a federal court sits in diversity. See also Craig Green, 
Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 614–15 (2008).  References to the “Erie 
doctrine” in this Article thus pertain to the narrow doctrine. 
 8. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 
YALE L.J. 333, 334 (1933). 
 9. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
 10. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules:  An 
Essay on What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707 (2006); Jennifer 
S. Hendricks, In Defense of the Substance-Procedure Dichotomy, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 103 
(2011); cf. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work:  Does Anyone Else Think 
the Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998) (arguing that Hanna created “a reasonably stable, 
workable, and sensible structure”). 
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Although the doctrine’s complexity long has been a source of frustration, 
complexity in itself is not an evil, particularly if it serves fundamental 
interests.  Indeed, for decades, courts and scholars have treated Erie as a 
guardian of vital structural interests, including federalism, separation of 
powers, and equality.  This Article develops a unique criticism of the Erie 
doctrine and argues that it actually accomplishes none of those goals. 
There is, however, a way out of the Erie wilderness.  Congress can fix 
nearly all of these problems, and this Article proposes a novel statute that 
revamps the Erie doctrine.  The proposed statute expands the scope of 
federal rulemaking authority, allowing courts to create a more 
comprehensive procedural regime that will apply consistently across federal 
courts.  Perhaps counterintuitively, the proposed statute also solves the 
current structural problem by defining states’ federalism interests more 
narrowly, albeit with greater precision, and offering more robust protection 
for those concrete interests.  Finally, on a practical level, the proposed 
statute consolidates the various strands of the Erie doctrine into a single test 
that federal courts can apply with greater ease and predictability. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I offers a brief overview of the 
Erie doctrine for those who have forgotten (or willfully expunged from 
their memory) all things Erie.  It demonstrates that nearly every difficult 
Erie-related question has concerned matters within the “twilight zone.”  
After offering haphazard answers to those questions for several decades,11 
the U.S. Supreme Court provided a measure of clarity in 1965 with Hanna 
v. Plumer,12 which created the structure of the modern doctrine. 
Although Hanna succeeded in certain respects, it essentially was a 
brilliant game of Jenga.  The Supreme Court subtly removed the central 
support for the Erie doctrine—the constitutional justification—and left 
intact the doctrinal structure and precedents.  While the Court correctly 
recognized that the Constitution does not compel Erie, the doctrine’s 
modern incarnation is structurally weak and bereft of a sound theoretical 
grounding.  At times it is overly deferential to state law, and at other times 
it allows federal procedure to trump significant state policies.  Moreover, in 
recent years, new uncertainties have crept into the doctrine and revealed 
deeper problems. 
Part II demonstrates that the Erie doctrine fails to protect any coherent 
vision of the structural interests that supposedly are at its core.  The 
problem derives from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the two statutes 
at the heart of the modern doctrine—the Rules Enabling Act (Enabling Act) 
and the Rules of Decision Act (Decision Act).  As other scholars have 
recognized, the Court’s theory about the Enabling Act has remained elusive 
and inconsistent. 
 
 11. Compare Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) 
(refusing to apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3 for Erie-related reasons), with Sibbach 
v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 without 
discussing Erie implications). 
 12. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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The more salient and overlooked problem, which this Article is the first 
to explore, is that the Court has applied the Decision Act in an anomalous 
way that does not protect any lucid conception of federalism or equality.  
The Decision Act, as interpreted since Hanna, seeks to avoid vertical forum 
shopping—a litigant’s preference between state and federal court—and the 
inequality to which it supposedly leads.  In Erie itself, the Court treated the 
potential difference in outcomes between state and federal courts as 
constitutionally problematic.  But the Constitution does not compel Erie, 
nor does it require exact equality of results in different courts.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has rejected the same arguments regarding the importance 
of identical outcomes when different states apply each other’s laws.  Forum 
shopping, therefore, is not a symptom of unconstitutional behavior.  
Moreover, the focus on forum shopping obscures states’ far more 
significant interest in regulating conduct within their borders.  In other 
words, the modern Erie doctrine does not advance a defensible vision of 
either federalism or equality and thus has become a solution in search of a 
problem. 
Part III proposes a statutory revision with three significant innovations.  
First, it defines states’ federalism interests with greater particularity.  
Specifically, states should retain the ability to adopt truly substantive 
rules—rules that seek to regulate conduct directly, most often expressed in 
the elements of a cause of action and the defenses that respond directly to 
those elements.  In this way, the revised statute protects a coherent vision of 
federalism by encouraging states to make their substantive policy choices 
clear and directing federal courts to protect those choices more rigorously. 
Second, the statute unifies the Erie analysis into a single test that expands 
the scope of federal rulemaking authority and more clearly vindicates the 
proper role of federalism.  Simply put, Congress should authorize federal 
courts to create any rules that are unquestionably procedural or fall within 
the twilight zone.13  Congress has the power to promulgate such rules on its 
own.  Consistent with current doctrine, Congress also may delegate such 
rulemaking authority to the federal courts, which enjoy a unique expertise 
on procedural questions.  Just as the statute protects states’ substantive 
policy choices more robustly, it promotes uniformity and predictability 
within the federal procedural regime. 
Third, federal courts should retain the power to adopt rules through the 
current, formal rulemaking process and also to create rules interstitially 
when adjudicating specific cases.  From a policy perspective, the proposed 
regime finds support in administrative law.  Federal agencies have latitude 
to choose how they announce new procedural rules, whether through a 
 
 13. I leave for another article a question that others have addressed at length—the 
federal courts’ power to create truly substantive common law. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, 
Federal Common Law:  A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); 
Martha A. Field, Sources of Law:  The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
881 (1986); Green, supra note 7; Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal 
Common Law, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 585 (2006); Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Is There 
Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980). 
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formalized notice-and-comment process or more informally through 
adjudications.  Such discretion has been a mainstay of administrative law 
and generally has been a virtue rather than a recipe for chaos.  The parallels 
to administrative law are especially apt in this context since federal courts 
would exercise discretion in an area—federal procedure—in which they 
have particular expertise, just as administrative agencies enjoy discretion 
within their areas of core competence. 
The statutory revision thus creates a more predictable and easily 
administrable doctrine.  Moreover, unlike the current Erie doctrine, it 
effectuates coherent structural concerns about the allocation of power 
among states, Congress, and the federal courts. 
I.  THE MODERN ERIE DOCTRINE 
This Part offers a brief overview of how the modern Erie doctrine 
developed, including an analysis of how Hanna v. Plumer subtly recast the 
doctrine.  It also demonstrates how Hanna’s edifice of clarity and 
workability has begun to crumble. 
A.  The Symmetry of 1938:  Erie and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Erie’s narrow holding—despite doubts about some of its reasoning, the 
torrent of scholarship that the case has unleashed, and the doctrinal 
complexity that has ensued—is simple.  In diversity cases, federal courts 
apply state substantive law.  All of it.14 
At issue in Erie was the proper interpretation of the Rules of Decision 
Act, which the first Congress enacted as section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789.15  Despite certain stylistic changes over the years, the substance of 
the Decision Act has remained unchanged since then.  It provides, in 
relevant part, that “[t]he laws of the several states . . . shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases 
where they apply.”16 
In 1842, in Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court had interpreted the 
Decision Act to mean that a federal court, when hearing a state-law claim 
based on diversity jurisdiction, must apply a state’s substantive statutory 
law but not necessarily a state’s judge-made law (or, common law).17  
Federal courts thus had authority to disregard state judge-made law and 
instead create their own common law to apply in diversity actions.  In 1938, 
Erie declared that Swift’s interpretation of the Decision Act was both 
incorrect and unconstitutional.18  Speaking through Justice Louis Brandeis, 
the Court held: “There is no federal general common law.  Congress has no 
 
 14. See supra note 7 (distinguishing Erie’s narrow application to diversity cases and 
Erie’s “megadoctrine”). 
 15. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 16. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 944 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). 
 17. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 18. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–79. 
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power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state . . . .  
And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the 
federal courts.”19  Erie thus made clear that states have full authority to 
announce their own substantive law, whether through statutes or judicial 
decisions, and that federal courts must apply that law. 
A certain symmetry arose in 1938.  In addition to the Court’s decision of 
Erie, the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) went into effect.  
Promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act of 1934, the FRCP aspired 
to create a uniform system of procedure for the federal courts.  Thus, the 
dual developments meant that federal courts sitting in diversity were to 
apply federal procedural law and state substantive law.20 
The symmetry of 1938 quickly foundered on the stark reality that 
substance and procedure can become frustratingly enmeshed and that 
procedure often affects the outcome of litigation.  For instance, a statute of 
limitations, though not purporting to be substantive in the sense of 
regulating someone’s conduct, can have a dispositive effect on whether a 
plaintiff may bring a lawsuit.21  The burden of proof22 and rules governing 
contributory negligence23 similarly seek to govern litigation conduct but 
nonetheless also can dictate which side wins. 
B.  Hanna’s Creation of the Modern Erie Doctrine 
In the early years of Erie and the FRCP, the Court struggled to find a 
coherent methodology for navigating the questions that fall within the 
twilight zone between substance and procedure.24  Part of the problem was 
the Court’s conflation of three distinct sources of law that make up the Erie 
doctrine:  the Constitution, the Rules of Decision Act, and the Rules 
Enabling Act.  The Constitution establishes the outer bounds of federal 
lawmaking authority.  The Decision Act, as interpreted since Erie, declares 
that state substantive law provides the rule of decision in diversity cases.  
And the Enabling Act authorizes the Supreme Court to establish “general 
rules of practice and procedure” for the federal courts (including the now-
familiar FRCP).25  In those early years, the Court viewed nearly every Erie-
related question through the same lens and focused on whether application 
of the federal rule, regardless of whether it was nominally “substantive” or 
“procedural,” would change the outcome of a case.26  That test nearly 
 
 19. Id. at 78. 
 20. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). 
 21. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (treating a state statute of 
limitations as outcome determinative even though a federal doctrine of laches might have led 
to the identical outcome). 
 22. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939). 
 23. See, e.g., Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). 
 24. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956); Ragan v. 
Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532–33 (1949). 
 25. Others include the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. 
 26. See Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 202; Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532–34; Guaranty Trust Co., 
326 U.S. at 109; see also Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536–37 
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always forced federal law to yield to state law.  The Court made occasional 
nods to the FRCP27 and the vague possibility of “countervailing 
considerations,”28 but it never devised a systematic way to navigate those 
various interests.  Consequently, the results and logic of the early cases 
were inscrutable. 
The contours of the modern Erie doctrine came into focus in 1965 with 
Hanna v. Plumer,29 which disaggregated the three sources of law and 
largely crafted the tests that courts apply when analyzing them.30  Hanna 
reasoned, correctly, that the original outcome-determinative test—which the 
Court had applied rather indiscriminately—proves too much.  Every 
procedural variation between state and federal rules has the potential to 
affect the outcome of litigation.31  Indeed, in the years between Erie and 
Hanna, the Court concluded that nearly every federal rule was outcome 
determinative and thus “often bent over backwards to apply state law.”32  
As a result, the earlier unvarnished outcome-determinative test had 
threatened to swallow even the most mundane procedural rules.33  In 
charting a new course, Hanna made three important moves that gave rise to 
the modern Erie doctrine. 
1.  Modifying the Outcome-Determinative Test 
First, the Court declared that the mere prospect of a different outcome 
was not the appropriate test.  Instead, it crafted what has become known as 
the “unguided Erie choice”34 or the “modified outcome-determinative 
test.”35  Hanna held that courts must apply the test “with[] reference to the 
twin aims of the Erie rule:  discouragement of forum-shopping and 
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”36  In so doing, the 
Court made clear that the relevant time for assessing whether application of 
 
(1958) (recognizing the outcome-determinative test but noting “affirmative countervailing 
considerations”). 
 27. See supra note 11. 
 28. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537. 
 29. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).  In fact, Hanna is so central to the current Erie analysis that 
Professor Thomas Rowe refers to the doctrine as the “Erie-Hanna doctrine.” Rowe, supra 
note 10, at 966. 
 30. See generally Ely, supra note 3. 
 31. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 32. Hendricks, supra note 10, at 112. 
 33. The earlier outcome-determinative test could have undermined even the service of 
process rules at issue in Hanna itself. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.  Hanna involved a 
conflict between what was then Rule 4(d) (now Rule 4(e)), which permitted service of 
process on any person of suitable age at the defendant’s dwelling place, and the 
Massachusetts rule that required personal service on the executor of an estate.  In Hanna, the 
defendant’s wife was served at their home in compliance with the federal rule but not the 
state rule. See id. at 461–62. 
 34. Id. at 471. 
 35. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 712 
(1995); see also Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act:  
In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356, 360 (1977) (referring to 
Hanna’s “modified outcome determination test”). 
 36. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
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a particular rule would be outcome determinative is at the point when forum 
shopping might occur—at the start of litigation.37 
2.  Bifurcating the Erie Analysis 
Second, Hanna created a bifurcated approach for dealing with certain 
conflicts between federal and state law.  In diversity cases, federal courts 
usually apply state substantive law; that is just the narrow rule from Erie 
itself.38  But if there is a conflict between federal and state law regarding an 
issue that is not clearly substantive, then a court must follow one of two 
routes, depending on the source of the federal law. The modified outcome-
determinative test, with its focus on avoiding forum shopping, applies only 
when the source of the federal rule is judge-made law (such as abstention or 
the equitable doctrine of laches). 
On the other hand, the Rules Enabling Act provides the mode of analysis 
when the FRCP or other congressionally authorized rules are at issue.  
Under this prong of Hanna, the standards of Erie itself and the modified 
outcome-determinative test are irrelevant.39  The validity and applicability 
of the FRCP are subject to a much more generous standard—as long as the 
FRCP “really regulates procedure,”40 then it is valid and applicable.41 
By bifurcating the Erie analysis, Hanna essentially saved the FRCP.  As 
noted above, the original outcome-determinative test had threatened to 
leave almost no room for the FRCP to operate in the face of contrary state 
law.  Similarly, the modified outcome-determinative test would have called 
for the FRCP to yield to state law in many instances.42  Thus, by creating a 
different mode of analysis for the FRCP and other congressionally 
authorized rules—a test that overwhelmingly favored their validity and 
applicability—Hanna ensured that the FRCP would apply broadly in all 
federal cases. 
 
 37. See id. at 468–69. 
 38. State law, of course, is always subject to the trump of a federal constitutional 
command or a federal statute that preempts state law. See Clermont, supra note 7, at 5–9.  As 
noted earlier, the present analysis deals principally with Erie’s application to diversity 
actions rather than Erie’s megadoctrine of federal-state relations. See supra note 7 and 
accompanying text. 
 39. Cf. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001) (blending 
Hanna’s two prongs). 
 40. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464 (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 41. Hanna noted that an FRCP still must be constitutional; however, the constitutional 
test is quite lax, permitting any FRCP that “fall[s] within the uncertain area between 
substance and procedure” and is “rationally capable of classification as either.” Id. at 472; 
see also infra note 212. 
 42. The Court at times has acknowledged that determining which Hanna test applies—
the modified outcome-determinative test or the “really regulates procedure” test—can be 
dispositive. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 
(2010); see also Adam N. Steinman, Our Class Action Federalism:  Erie and the Rules 
Enabling Act After Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1131, 1136 (2011); Kevin M. 
Clermont, The Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 987, 1012 (2011). 
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3.  Deconstitutionalizing Erie 
Hanna’s third move, while less explicit, effectively deconstitutionalized 
the Erie analysis, at least with respect to the twilight zone, which has been 
the source of nearly all Erie-related difficulties. 
Erie was self-consciously a constitutional decision.  The Court reasoned 
that “the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made 
clear,” and such unconstitutionality compelled the Court’s interpretation of 
the Decision Act.43  Erie’s constitutional arguments, though sparse, were 
rooted in two notions of federalism, both of which were wrong when the 
Court decided Erie and over time have become even more obviously 
erroneous. 
The first constitutional argument was predicated on the notion that the 
states and the federal government were separate sovereigns.  According to 
Erie, federal courts, by creating substantive general common law, had 
“invaded rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several 
States.”44  That argument largely echoes the Tenth Amendment, which 
provides that powers not granted to the federal government “are reserved to 
the States respectively.”45 
Erie scholarship has not been kind to this species of the federalism 
argument, and after Erie the Supreme Court alluded to it only once more.46  
The “separate sovereigns” approach, which effectively treated states as 
independent nations, was “controversial from the beginning”47 and in recent 
years has met with “near-universal disdain.”48  It was “steeped in now-
discredited views of state autonomy” that were a relic of Lochner-era 
federalism.49  Moreover, the Tenth Amendment does not obviously displace 
Article III, which expressly provides for diversity jurisdiction.  Some 
scholars have argued that implicit within the grant of diversity jurisdiction 
is federal courts’ power to create even substantive law that applies in 
 
 43. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938). 
 44. Id. at 80. 
 45. U.S. CONST. amend. X.  Moreover, Erie cited approvingly to an opinion that had 
offered a full-throated defense of the idea that the Tenth Amendment recognizes the states as 
“separate and distinct sovereignties.” Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 
(1893) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 46. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202 (1956); see also Ely, 
supra note 3, at 704–06; cf. Hanna, 480 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (arguing that 
federal law should not substantially affect “those primary decisions respecting human 
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation”). 
 47. Suzanna Sherry, Wrong, Out of Step, and Pernicious:  Erie As the Worst Decision of 
All Time, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 129, 142 (2011). 
 48. Green, supra note 7, at 608; see also Ely, supra note 3, at 701–02 (rejecting state-
enclave theory); David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism 
Implications of Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1276–77 (2007) 
(arguing that United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183–84 (1936), effectively 
foreclosed the Tenth Amendment argument). But see Friendly, supra note 3, at 395 (offering 
one of the few modern defenses of the Tenth Amendment justification for Erie). 
 49. Green, supra note 7, at 608; see also Sherry, supra note 47, at 143. 
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diversity cases,50 a view espoused by certain Founders.51  Thus, even in its 
own time, Erie’s separate-sovereigns argument was wrong as a matter of 
constitutional theory because it represented a fundamental 
misunderstanding of federal-state relations. 
The second version of the federalism argument propounded by Erie was 
based on the idea that the federal government is one of enumerated powers 
and may regulate only when the Constitution so authorizes.52  When the 
Court decided Erie, the enumerated-powers argument was strained on the 
facts of the case.  The Erie Railroad, a New York company operating in 
Pennsylvania, engaged in interstate commerce; consequently, Congress had 
latitude, even under the narrow view of the Commerce Clause that prevailed 
in the early twentieth century, to regulate the railroad’s activities.53  
Precisely because federal power was broad enough to regulate the railroad, 
Erie itself was a poor case in which to announce a categorical rule derived 
from the limited nature of federal power. 
The enumerated-powers explanation had become even less plausible by 
1965, when the Court decided Hanna.  To the extent that that explanation 
relies on the federal government’s lack of particular powers, such that 
neither Congress nor a court may exercise certain lawmaking authority, the 
argument proves little.54  By 1965, the federal government had acquired 
vast regulatory powers that bordered on plenary.55  There indeed might be 
 
 50. See Green, supra note 7, at 609.  Some scholars have argued that implicit within the 
Article III grant of diversity jurisdiction is federal courts’ power to create even substantive 
law that applies in diversity cases. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 
TEX. L. REV. 79, 98, 118 (1993); Field, supra note 13, at 915–19; Sherry, supra note 47, at 
146. 
 51. At the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, James Wilson argued: 
[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or private credit, that 
foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which they 
may resort?  I would ask, how a merchant must feel to have his property lay at the 
mercy of the laws of Rhode Island.  I ask, further, how will a creditor feel, who has 
his debts at the mercy of tender laws in other states? 
2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 519 (Merrill 
Jensen ed., 1976). 
 52. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State. . . .  And no clause in the 
Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”). 
 53. See Green, supra note 7, at 608–09 (arguing that Erie relied in part on the logic of 
“Lochner-era federalism” that initially impeded much of the New Deal legislation); id. at 
612 (arguing that Erie involved facts that indisputably fell within Congress’s legislative 
powers); Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 921, 974 n.164 (2013) (same); Sherry, supra note 47, at 143–44 (same); see also S. 
Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 27 (1911). 
 54. See Green, supra note 7, at 613; Sherry, supra note 47, at 144 & n.87.  One could 
certainly make the argument that courts’ lawmaking powers are even more narrowly 
circumscribed than Congress’s.  But that was not Erie’s argument. See infra notes 300–10 
and accompanying text. 
 55. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 
1 (1937).  Even today, recent high-profile decisions have limited that power only at the 
margins. See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.); id. 
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some cases that are within a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction but 
nonetheless concern matters over which the federal government has no 
lawmaking power.  But the number of those cases had become—and 
remains—vanishingly small.56  Consequently, as most scholars recognize, 
the concept of enumerated powers cannot explain why the rule of Erie 
should govern the lion’s share of cases.57 
Hanna implicitly acknowledged the problems with Erie’s constitutional 
arguments and, without saying so, changed the Court’s interpretation of the 
Erie doctrine’s essence.  The Court effectively deconstitutionalized Erie by 
ignoring the constitutional arguments and turning Erie’s basic holding into 
a matter of statutory interpretation.  At no point does the Hanna opinion 
refer explicitly to either the Constitution or the Decision Act.  The scholarly 
consensus, though, is that Hanna’s modified outcome-determinative test is 
a means of applying the Decision Act rather than the Constitution.58 
Indeed, it would be strange for Hanna’s many references to the “Erie 
rule,” and the identification of the rule’s twin aims, to pertain to anything 
other than the Decision Act.  Hanna makes plain that when an FRCP is at 
issue, its validity and applicability are not subject to the modified outcome-
determinative test—i.e., the “Erie rule”—but, instead, to the much more 
forgiving inquiry of whether the rule “really regulates procedure.”59  If an 
FRCP passes that test, it satisfies the Enabling Act and governs, irrespective 
of whether it would be outcome determinative.  Consequently, the outcome-
determinative test does not derive from a constitutional imperative because, 
if it did, it would apply even to the FRCP.  Hanna’s bifurcation of the 
Decision Act and the Enabling Act is the key to understanding how the 
Court subtly relegated the Constitution to the background of almost every 
difficult Erie question.60 
 
 
at 2642 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting); United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 56. See Green, supra note 7, at 612–14. 
 57. Modern scholars who still believe that Erie has constitutional underpinnings 
recognize that the enumerated-powers explanation has little purchase. See Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (1985); 
Redish, supra note 4, at 766 n.19; see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers As a 
Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1416 (2001). But see Ely, supra note 3, at 
702–04 (offering a limited defense of the enumerated-powers rationale to justify Erie’s 
actual holding but arguing that, beyond that, “the Constitution’s utility as a point of reference 
was ended”). 
 58. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 3, at 707–18; Rowe, supra note 10, at 985; see also Adam 
N. Steinman, What Is the Erie Doctrine?  (And What Does It Mean for the Contemporary 
Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 314–15 (2008). 
 59. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464, 470–71 (1965) (noting that validity is 
governed by the Sibbach test). 
 60. See Ely, supra note 3, at 707–18. 
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*  *  * 
After Hanna, the Erie world seemed clearer.  The Constitution, at most, 
compels federal courts to apply unambiguously substantive state law, but 
the two relevant statutes govern matters within the twilight zone.  When the 
source of the federal rule is judge-made law, the Decision Act requires 
courts to apply the modified outcome-determinative test, which puts a 
thumb on the scale, favoring application of state law.  When the source of 
the federal rule is an FRCP adopted pursuant to the Enabling Act, the test is 
whether the FRCP really regulates procedure.  That test favors application 
of the FRCP rather than any conflicting state rule.61 
C.  Newfound Uncertainty 
Despite Hanna’s aura of predictability, over the last two decades, the 
Supreme Court has pursued what Professor Jennifer Hendricks 
characterizes as a confusing and ill-fated “third way” of the Erie doctrine.62  
The first phase, in the immediate aftermath of Erie itself, was overly 
deferential to state law.  The second phase, beginning with Hanna, saw the 
almost universal applicability of the FRCP, notwithstanding even important 
state policies to the contrary.63  Since 1996, though, the Supreme Court has 
decided three cases that embody an equivocal approach—a labyrinthine 
third way—under which lower courts and litigants cannot readily discern 
whether and to what extent federal law will apply in diversity cases.64 
Each of the three cases introduced a new element of uncertainty into the 
Erie calculus.  The first, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,65 
concerned a clash between New York’s heightened standard for appellate 
review of jury awards and the more deferential federal standard.  Applying 
Hanna’s “twin aims” analysis under the modified outcome-determinative 
test, the Court concluded that the state standard was substantive for Erie 
purposes.66  Nonetheless, it noted that the Seventh Amendment governs the 
allocation of authority between trial and appellate courts in the federal 
system.67  To accommodate both of those conclusions, the Court performed 
rather elaborate statutory surgery.  It directed federal trial courts to apply 
New York’s heightened appellate standard in reviewing jury awards for 
excessiveness, thus giving “effect to the substantive thrust” of New York 
law.68  But federal appellate courts were to continue reviewing lower court 
decisions according to the more deferential federal standard, thereby 
 
 61. See, e.g., Steinman, supra note 42, at 1136. 
 62. Hendricks, supra note 10, at 124–25. 
 63. See id. at 105. 
 64. See id. at 105–06. 
 65. 518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
 66. See id. at 428. But see id. at 467–68 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the source 
of federal law was Rule 59, governing motions for new trials, and that Hanna counseled 
application of that particular Rule). 
 67. See id. at 432 (majority opinion). 
 68. Id. at 426, 438. 
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preserving the Seventh Amendment’s division of authority among federal 
courts.69  The Court’s attempt at a Solomonic solution did not receive high 
marks for clarity, administrability, or coherence.70 
The second case, Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,71 
gave an exceedingly narrow construction72 to Rule 41(b),73 which governs 
whether a dismissal “operates as an adjudication upon the merits.”74  
Virtually every court system had given claim-preclusive effect to “merits” 
dismissals (despite some disagreements about which dismissals belonged in 
that category).75  But Semtek rejected the idea that a merits dismissal 
pursuant to Rule 41(b) was one to which preclusion attached.  Such an 
unnatural cabining of Rule 41(b) stemmed from the Court’s fear that a rule 
regulating preclusion would be “too substantive” and thus run afoul of the 
Enabling Act’s prohibition against rules that “abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”76  Instead of applying state law, though, the Court 
decided to create federal common law on preclusion.  Then, in a second 
head-fake, the Court borrowed the relevant state law and incorporated it 
into the federal common law.77 
Most recently, in Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.,78 the Court divided on a number of questions regarding how 
to assess the validity and applicability of the FRCP, specifically with regard 
to Rule 23, which regulates federal class actions.  For instance, the plurality 
argued that an FRCP’s validity turns only on whether it is sufficiently 
procedural or impermissibly substantive; the procedural or substantive 
nature of the affected state law is immaterial.79  By contrast, the 
concurrence and dissent argued that the nature of the conflicting state law 
does matter.80  The Court also evinced disagreement about whether an 
FRCP that is valid under the Enabling Act nonetheless might be 
inapplicable in a given case.81  Although a majority of justices held that 
Rule 23 should apply broadly, there was no majority opinion regarding 
 
 69. See id. at 438. 
 70. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 708; Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts 
on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1637, 1663 (1998); Hendricks, supra 
note 10, at 125–26; cf. Rowe, supra note 10, at 966 (offering a mild defense of Gasperini). 
 71. 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
 72. See Clermont, supra note 42, at 1012 (noting the “strangely narrow scope” that the 
Court gave Rule 41(b)); Hendricks, supra note 10, at 120 (noting the “implausible reading of 
Rule 41(b)”); see also Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 723. 
 73. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (governing involuntary dismissal of actions). 
 74. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 501. 
 75. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 723. 
 76. Semtek, 531 U.S. at 503; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 77. See Semtek, 531 U.S. at 508–09; see also Hendricks, supra note 10, at 120–21. 
 78. 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010). 
 79. See id. at 1443–44 (plurality opinion). 
 80. See id. at 1449, 1450–52 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); id. at 1460–64 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 81. Compare id. at 1443–46 (plurality opinion), with id. at 1450–52 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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some of the most salient disagreements about how courts should interpret 
and apply the Enabling Act. 
In short, the Court has unsettled the stability that Hanna initially offered.  
Over the last twenty years, the cases have qualified the strong presumption 
in favor of the validity and applicability of codified federal rules and have 
shown more amenability to case-by-case challenges.  Perhaps these are only 
hard cases at the margins.  Nonetheless, they have created doctrinal 
instability to no useful end and, more tellingly, have begun to reveal the 
shaky foundations on which the doctrine rests. 
II.  THE MODERN BREAKDOWN 
The previous Part explored not only Hanna’s innovations, but also how 
Hanna failed to create a workable doctrine.  Although it probably comes as 
no surprise to most judges, scholars, and students that Erie presents 
enduring practical difficulties, this Part identifies a deeper and more 
insidious problem that, until now, the literature has not treated 
comprehensively. 
Erie’s complexity serves no useful end because the doctrine fails to 
protect any coherent vision of the structural interests that supposedly lie at 
its core.  In recent years, scholars have discussed certain tensions within the 
Court’s Enabling Act jurisprudence.  This Part begins by demonstrating that 
in spite of that recognition, neither scholars nor courts are gravitating 
toward a solution.  The lack of consensus derives from the doctrine’s larger 
structural problems. 
More significantly, this Part develops a novel criticism of the Court’s 
current approach to the Decision Act and its focus on avoiding forum 
shopping.82  Scholarly grumbling generally has bemoaned that approach’s 
incompleteness or lack of clarity.83  But hardly anyone has questioned the 
fundamental assumption that vertical forum shopping is an inherent evil 
that leads to unfairness.  This Part challenges the received wisdom of nearly 
all courts and scholars and argues that the supposed evil of forum shopping, 
and the perceived unfairness to which it might lead, are chimerical.  One of 
the bedrock policies that has animated the Erie doctrine for seventy-five 
years is, quite simply, wrong. 
The ultimate conclusion is not that the Erie doctrine is just unduly 
complex or leads to the occasional unfortunate decision.  Rather, the current 
doctrine fails to protect any defensible conception of federalism, separation 
of powers, or equality.  Until courts and scholars confront that overarching 
problem, no amount of tweaking at the margins will yield significantly 
better results. 
 
 82. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 10, at 984–85; Steinman, supra note 58, at 326–27. 
 83. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 42, at 998–1003; Rowe, supra note 10, at 1005. 
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A.  Pervasive Disputes About the Rules Enabling Act 
Courts and scholars frequently note that the Supreme Court never has 
invalidated an FRCP.84  That truism belies pervasive disagreements among 
scholars who have identified new uncertainty in the Court’s approach to the 
Enabling Act.  In some respects, though, that uncertainty always lurked just 
beneath the surface of Hanna.  What has become clear is that the tensions 
within the Court’s Enabling Act jurisprudence seem largely insuperable. 
1.  Tensions Regarding the Structural Purpose 
of the Enabling Act’s Restrictions 
One of the most conspicuous disagreements concerns the purpose of the 
Enabling Act’s directive that an FRCP may not “abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”85  Since the early years of the Erie doctrine, the 
Supreme Court has treated the restriction as one that protects federalism,86 
and in his iconic article, Professor John Hart Ely proceeded on the same 
assumption.87  But in a comprehensive history of the Enabling Act, 
Professor Stephen Burbank has argued persuasively that the restriction 
regarding substantive rights serves primarily to protect separation of powers 
interests—Congress’s authority to craft substantive policies.88  Since then, 
scholars overwhelmingly have embraced the separation of powers 
explanation even when they disagree about what lessons to draw from 
Professor Burbank’s insights.89  Notwithstanding general scholarly 
agreement, though, the Court has continued to regard federalism as the 
driving force behind the Enabling Act.90 
Misconstruing the underlying purpose of the Enabling Act can lead to 
odd and deleterious consequences.  Federalism and separation of powers 
interests often will be complementary, but not always.  Most conspicuously, 
 
 84. See, e.g., Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (plurality opinion); Stephen B. Burbank & 
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 17, 41 (2010); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 739. 
 85. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
 86. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 84, at 27–31 (tracing federalism rationale to 
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941)). 
 87. See Ely, supra note 3, at 718–40. 
 88. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 
1106–12 (1982). 
 89. See, e.g., Clermont, supra note 42, at 1007–08, 1014–15; Leslie M. Kelleher, Taking 
“Substantive Rights” (in the Rules Enabling Act) More Seriously, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
47, 92 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Dennis Murashko, The Rules Enabling Act and the 
Procedural-Substantive Tension:  A Lesson in Statutory Interpretation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 26, 
56 (2008); Rowe, supra note 10, at 979–80; see also Max Minzner, The Criminal Rules 
Enabling Act, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1047, 1057–60 (2012). But see Allan Ides, The Standard 
for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure:  The Shady Grove Debate 
Between Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041, 1063 (2011) (arguing 
that the displacement of substantive state law by an FRCP presents federalism problems); 
Kelleher, supra, at 90–91 & n.189 (noting the tendency of earlier scholarship to view the 
Enabling Act through a federalism lens). 
 90. See Minzner, supra note 89, at 1059–60; see also Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed 
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 504 (2001). 
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a focus on federalism can lead the Court to conclude that an FRCP has a 
narrower meaning in diversity cases than it does in federal question cases.  
For example, the Court has construed Rule 3, which governs the 
commencement of an action through the filing of a complaint, as not 
regulating whether such filing in federal court tolls a state statute of 
limitations.91  In other words, in the diversity setting, the Court has 
construed Rule 3 narrowly out of deference to state tolling provisions.92  By 
contrast, the Court has held that in federal question cases, Rule 3 is broader 
in scope and does operate as a tolling provision.93  The centrality of 
federalism concerns thus drove the divergent interpretations of Rule 3.  On 
the other hand, an orientation toward separation of powers likely would 
have avoided such a seemingly strange result.  The relevant inquiry would 
not have turned on myriad state policies but instead on the single question 
of whether Congress had addressed the issue or, through the Enabling Act, 
left its resolution to the federal courts.94 
The anomaly that an FRCP can mean different things in different 
contexts becomes increasingly likely when the Supreme Court treats the 
Enabling Act as a protector of federalism.95  As the Court’s jurisprudence 
has demonstrated, that approach threatens to undermine the goal of 
uniformity, which was among the Enabling Act’s chief objectives.96 
2.  Debate About the Scope of the FRCP 
Closely related is the issue of how broadly to construe an FRCP.  As 
discussed in Part I, Hanna bifurcated the analysis of Erie questions 
depending on whether the federal rule derived from judge-made law or 
instead from a congressionally authorized rule, such as the FRCP.  Because 
the FRCP are subject to the more forgiving “really regulates procedure” test 
(as opposed to the modified outcome-determinative test), they are almost 
certainly valid.  In light of that strong presumption, the dispositive question 
often is not whether an FRCP is valid but instead which particular issues 
come within its ambit.97  Therein lies the real difficulty—figuring out 
whether an FRCP covers any given matter. 
As Professor Adam Steinman has noted, the Supreme Court still has not 
provided concrete guidance on whether an FRCP governs a case.98  The 
 
 91. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer & 
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 
 92. In Walker and Ragan, state law provided that the statute of limitations was tolled 
only upon service, rather than filing, of the complaint. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 752–53; 
Ragan, 337 U.S. at 532–34. 
 93. See West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 38–39 (1987). 
 94. See Burbank & Wolff, supra note 84, at 44. 
 95. See Hendricks, supra note 10, at 120 (arguing that Semtek likely means Rule 41(b) 
will operate differently in diversity and federal question cases); see also Burbank & Wolff, 
supra note 84, at 42 (noting that an exclusive focus on federalism would render the Enabling 
Act “a dead letter in federal question cases”). 
 96. See Redish & Murashko, supra note 89, at 56. 
 97. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749. 
 98. See Steinman, supra note 42, at 1135. 
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various formulations for this inquiry include whether an issue “is covered 
by one of the Federal Rules,”99 whether there is a “‘direct collision’ 
between the Federal Rule and the state law,”100 whether the state and 
federal rules “can exist side by side,”101 and “whether the scope of the 
Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the 
Court.”102  Moreover, the Court has vacillated on the methodology for 
interpreting the FRCP.103  On some occasions, it has observed that “Federal 
Rules [of Civil Procedure] should be given their plain meaning” rather than 
an unduly narrow construction that averts “a ‘direct collision’ with state 
law.”104  At other times, though, the Court has abandoned that approach and 
expressly approved of narrowing constructions that are “sensitiv[e] to 
important state interests and regulatory policies.”105  The Court’s more 
explicit embrace of narrowing constructions is a relatively new 
development and lends further credence to the notion that the Court’s Erie 
jurisprudence is increasingly unstable. 
Although other scholars have explored the indeterminacy of the Court’s 
current approach to ascertaining the scope of a given rule,106 one example 
succinctly illustrates the murkiness.  In Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. 
Woods,107 the Supreme Court considered a potential conflict involving an 
Alabama statute that imposed a mandatory 10 percent penalty when a losing 
party seeks to stay a judgment, by posting a bond, but then loses the appeal.  
The Court noted that the statute’s purpose was to deter frivolous appeals 
and unnecessary delays.108  By contrast, Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 38 made a penalty discretionary rather than mandatory.109  Under 
one of the Court’s earlier formulations, the two rules arguably could exist 
“side by side”; under Rule 38, nothing prevents a federal court from 
imposing the 10 percent penalty required by Alabama law.  But the Court 
found a “direct collision” between the discretionary federal rule and the 
inflexible Alabama rule.110  In essence, the Court held that because the two 
competing rules sought to govern precisely the same question, the state law 
 
 99. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). 
 100. See Walker, 446 U.S. at 749. 
 101. Id. at 752. 
 102. Id. at 749–50; see also Steinman, supra note 42, at 1135–36 (collecting other 
formulations). 
 103. See Clermont, supra note 42, at 1010–13, 1021–23. 
 104. Walker, 446 U.S. at 750 n.9; see also Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 
26 (1988). 
 105. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 n.7 (1996); see also 
Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 503–04 (2001). 
 106. See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 84, at 35–41; Clermont, supra note 42, at 
1019–27; Steinman, supra note 42, at 1169–73. 
 107. 480 U.S. 1 (1987). 
 108. See id. at 3–4. 
 109. See id. at 4.  The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, like the FRCP, are 
authorized by the Enabling Act and are subject to the same analysis. 
 110. See id. at 4–8. 
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had to yield, but it made no serious attempt to reconcile the seemingly 
disparate standards that purport to determine the scope of an FRCP.111 
3.  Uncertainty About How Litigants May Challenge the FRCP 
Courts and scholars also have disagreed about the extent to which 
litigants may challenge the validity or applicability of the FRCP and the 
standards that govern such questions.  Some have argued that only 
wholesale (facial) challenges are permissible, while others maintain that 
retail (as-applied) challenges are also acceptable.  At issue is the interaction 
between two provisions of the Enabling Act:  the directive in § 2072(a) that 
the Supreme Court may promulgate “general rules of practice and 
procedure” and the qualification in § 2072(b) that “[s]uch rules shall not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 
The dominant approach in the jurisprudence and literature favors the 
wholesale approach—an FRCP, if valid under the Enabling Act, is 
applicable in all cases and not susceptible to case-by-case challenges.  But 
disagreements are pervasive even among those who regard the wholesale 
approach as appropriate.  Scholars long have disputed the appropriate 
standard for assessing an FRCP’s validity112 and, in particular, whether an 
FRCP runs afoul of § 2072(b)’s “substantive rights” restriction.113 
Other scholars and at least one Supreme Court justice have suggested that 
the Enabling Act permits case-by-case challenges to the FRCP.  Justice 
John Paul Stevens’s concurrence in Shady Grove exemplifies such an 
approach, which essentially says that even if an FRCP is generally valid 
under § 2072(a) because it is sufficiently procedural in nature, it 
nonetheless might be inapplicable in a given case because the FRCP 
disturbs a substantive right created by state law.114  In the wake of Shady 
Grove, some scholars have written approvingly about the possibility of as-
applied challenges to the FRCP.115 
 
 111. See id. 
 112. The Court’s early approach treated substance and procedure as mutually exclusive, 
such that compliance with one prong of § 2072 signaled compliance with the other. See 
Redish & Murashko, supra note 89, at 58–61 (discussing the Court’s approach in Sibbach v. 
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941)).  Professor Ely disagreed, arguing that a rule might be 
sufficiently procedural under § 2072(a) but nonetheless might affect substantive rights and 
thereby run afoul of § 2072(b). See Ely, supra note 3, at 718–20. 
 113. Compare Burbank, supra note 88, at 1160 (arguing that an FRCP violates § 2072(b) 
and is invalid if it has a “predictable and identifiable” effect on substantive law), with Redish 
& Murashko, supra note 89, at 87–93 (arguing that an FRCP is valid under § 2072(b) even if 
it has an “incidental” impact on substantive rights).  Many scholars have argued that the 
Court should give more teeth to § 2072(b). See, e.g., Kelleher, supra note 89, at 108–09; 
Minzner, supra note 89, at 1048–49; Rowe, supra note 10, at 996. 
 114. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 
1451–55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 115. See generally Ides, supra note 89; Catherine T. Struve, Institutional Practice, 
Procedural Uniformity, and As-Applied Challenges Under the Rules Enabling Act, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1181 (2011). 
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As one scholar has observed, the conundrum of interpreting the Enabling 
Act, particularly in light of the elusive purpose and meaning of its 
“substantive rights” limitation, is “inherently unresolvable.”116  In some 
ways, the Supreme Court has fomented the confusion with several recent 
opinions.117  In other ways, the problem is inherent in the Enabling Act 
itself.  The drafters of the statute generally thought of substance and 
procedure as mutually exclusive categories, and the Enabling Act’s 
language reflects that idea, even though the twilight zone between 
substance and procedure is capacious.118  In other words, the tensions 
within the Enabling Act likely are insuperable precisely because the statute 
is infused with false assumptions.  It should come as no surprise, then, that 
courts and scholars are not gravitating toward any sort of consensus about 
how to interpret and apply the Enabling Act. 
B.  The Incoherence of the Modern Understanding  
of the Rules of Decision Act 
The remainder of this Part challenges the prevailing wisdom about the 
current interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, specifically its focus on 
applying Erie’s “twin aims”—avoiding forum shopping and inequitable 
administration of the laws.119  That vision of the Decision Act is erroneous, 
represents bad policy, and does not advance a coherent vision of federalism.  
I trace the problem back to Hanna.  As discussed above, Hanna imposed 
needed order on the Erie doctrine but made a seemingly subtle move—
grafting some of Erie’s constitutional analysis onto the Decision Act—that 
has had deleterious consequences. 
1.  Hanna’s Importation of Erie’s Constitutional Analysis  
into the Decision Act 
Hanna’s greatest achievement was rescuing the FRCP.  If the Court had 
continued to apply the old outcome-determinative test to every potential 
conflict between state and federal law, nearly every FRCP might have 
foundered on the possibility that it could alter the end result of litigation.120  
Moreover, Hanna recognized that the Constitution plays, at most, an 
 
 116. Linda S. Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action 
Amendments, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 618 (1997). 
 117. See supra Part I.C. 
 118. See Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling 
Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules:  Constitutional and Statutory Implications, 
90 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1311 (2006); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making 
Process:  Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 
887, 896–97 (1999). 
 119. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). 
 120. See id. at 473–74 (noting that the unmediated outcome-determinative test risked 
“disembowel[ing] either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or 
Congress’ attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act”). 
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insignificant role in the Erie doctrine, which always has been more 
solicitous of state prerogatives than the Constitution requires.121 
The problem, which has gone largely unrecognized in the Erie literature, 
is that Hanna imposed what Justice Brandeis thought was an essential part 
of Erie’s constitutional justification—the evils of forum shopping and 
disparate treatment of litigants between state and federal court—onto the 
Decision Act.122  While Hanna effectively interred the constitutional 
analysis, the Court also tried not to upset the entire body of Erie doctrine 
precedents.  Most conspicuously, Hanna refused to abandon the outcome-
determinative test that had become a hallmark of earlier decisions.123  But 
the current statutory interpretation, unmoored from Erie’s original 
constitutional analysis, lacks any sound theoretical justification and has led 
to untoward results, including unnecessary layers of complexity that do not 
actually protect federalism interests. 
As demonstrated above, Justice Brandeis clearly regarded Erie’s result as 
constitutionally compelled.124  At the heart of the Court’s analysis, and the 
impetus for the sea change wrought by Erie, was what the Court perceived 
as the “unconstitutionality” of the earlier regime in which fundamental 
notions of federalism were offended when state and federal courts applied 
different substantive law.125  The other evils against which the Court 
inveighed, including forum shopping and the “grave discrimination” 
occasioned by unequal enforcement of rights,126 were derivative of the 
putative constitutional problem. 
The best reading of Erie is that forum shopping and differential outcomes 
were not actually problems in themselves, even though Justice Brandeis’s 
strong language might suggest otherwise.  Instead, forum shopping and 
variance between the substantive law applied in federal and state courts 
were indicative of an overarching violation of federalism principles.127  In 
other words, the “twin aims of the Erie rule”128 that Hanna reformulated 
into the modified outcome-determinative test were part and parcel of Erie’s 
constitutional analysis. 
The difficulty for the modern incarnation of the twin aims is now twofold 
(appropriately enough):  first, constitutional federalism does not compel 
Erie;129 second, Hanna incorporated the twin aims analysis, divorced from 
 
 121. See Ely, supra note 3, at 704. 
 122. Cf. Steinman, supra note 58, at 314 (“There is . . . an uncomfortable mismatch 
between Erie’s purported constitutional basis and the current framework for applying the 
Erie doctrine.”). 
 123. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468–69. 
 124. See supra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
 125. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75, 77–78 (1938). 
 126. Id. at 74. 
 127. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 489, 512–13 (1954) (noting the “triviality of the principle” of mitigating forum 
shopping, which is a “relatively minor consideration” in addressing overarching federalism 
problems). 
 128. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. 
 129. See supra notes 46–58 and accompanying text. 
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its original context, into the current interpretation of the Rules of Decision 
Act.  As a result, the vestigial structure of Erie is a solution in search of a 
constitutional problem.  One might argue that even if the twin aims no 
longer protect constitutional federalism, they still might serve a useful 
purpose.  I consider and reject several possibilities below. 
2.  The Irrelevance of Forum Shopping to the Rules of Decision Act 
One possible defense of the current approach is that even if Erie was 
wrong about the constitutional question, the Decision Act independently 
disapproves of forum shopping.  Put another way, the Decision Act itself 
could embody a judgment that vertical forum shopping is inherently 
undesirable.  Such an argument is strained for two reasons.  First, recent 
historical scholarship argues that both Swift and Erie were wrong.130  The 
Decision Act’s command that “[t]he laws of the several states . . . shall be 
regarded as rules of decision”131 might not call for application of state law, 
whether written or unwritten.  At the time of the Founding, “the several 
states” often referred to the states collectively, whereas “the respective 
states” referred to the states individually.  Historical evidence—based on 
grammar, the location of the Decision Act in the Judiciary Act of 1789, and 
the debates in the First Congress—thus suggests that the Decision Act 
might have directed federal courts to apply American (rather than British) 
law.132 
Second, even if one accepts the position that the Decision Act requires 
that state substantive law apply in diversity actions,133 it strains credulity to 
argue that a “rule of decision” is a rule that influences a choice of forum.134  
The statute itself says nothing about forum shopping.  An interpretation of 
the Decision Act that focuses on forum shopping seems odd because it 
embraces an anomalous construction of the term “rule of decision,” which 
generally refers to the clearly substantive law that applies to a case.135  
Moreover, it fails to protect states’ actual interests.  Why would states care 
 
 130. See WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:  
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 83–87 (1990). 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). 
 132. See RITZ, supra note 130, at 83–87; see also Sherry, supra note 47, at 134–35 
(accepting Ritz’s conclusions). But see Michael G. Collins, Justice Iredell, Choice of Law, 
and the Constitution—A Neglected Encounter, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 163 (2006) (arguing 
that early interpretations of the Decision Act do not support Ritz’s argument); Nelson, supra 
note 53, at 958–59 (challenging Ritz’s conclusions). 
 133. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 53, at 959. 
 134. I am not aware of any court or scholar who has propounded such a definition of “rule 
of decision,” at least outside of the context of the Rules of Decision Act. 
 135. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “rule of decision” as “[a] rule, statute, body of law, 
or prior decision that provides the basis for deciding or adjudicating a case.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1448 (9th ed. 2009); see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 
748 (2012) (using “rules of decision” to refer to clearly substantive law); Am. Elec. Power 
Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2011) (same); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1768 (2010) (same); Lumen N. Mulligan, You Can’t Go Holmes 
Again, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 237, 242–43 (2012) (defining “rule of decision,” or “right,” as a 
clearly expressed, enforceable, mandatory obligation). 
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whether litigants choose state or federal courts?  Other things being equal—
including the outcome of the litigation and the state’s ability to ensure that 
its substantive law applies—they probably do not.  At most, states might 
have a dignitary interest136 in not being regarded as “inferior” to the federal 
government.137  But such constitutional dignity is a far cry from the dignity 
associated with individual litigants’ perceptions of different court systems 
(and the myriad reasons why a litigant might prefer one court over 
another).138  Even if that sort of dignitary interest were cognizable—and 
that seems unlikely—it would be strange for a statute to attempt to protect 
such an interest so obliquely through an anomalous use of the phrase “rule 
of decision.”  One would expect the Decision Act to have been clearer on 
that point. 
More likely, states have a far greater interest in either the ultimate 
outcome of the litigation or in influencing people’s primary conduct.  
Although states might be concerned about the outcome of litigation, the 
central fallacy of the early Erie cases was their assumption that such an 
interest should be dispositive.  For the reasons discussed above, the 
unvarnished outcome-determinative test proves too much and would leave 
little room for the operation of federal procedural law.139  Consequently, 
Hanna correctly rejected the idea that the Decision Act protects a state’s or 
litigant’s interest in exact equality of outcome between state and federal 
courts.140 
As I argue in Part III, though, states do have an interest in regulating 
people’s primary conduct.  That interest seems paramount, especially in 
comparison to an amorphous desire to influence litigants’ forum choices.  
Consequently, it would make much more sense if federal courts treated a 
“rule of decision” as a rule directed at primary conduct rather than one that 
influences choices at the start of litigation. 
 
 136. To be sure, one premise of the Constitution is that “state courts enjoy parity of 
constitutional competence with the lower federal courts.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1154–55 (1988); see also Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress To Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:  An Exercise 
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1952). 
 137. One might argue that a state has an interest in maintaining control of the entire 
apparatus that governs the creation, enforcement, and adjudication of laws.  But the entire 
concept of federal diversity jurisdiction refutes the idea that such an interest is cognizable 
under the Constitution. 
 138. Moreover, it is hard to see how a state’s dignitary interest is negatively affected 
when forum shopping leads a litigant to choose state court.  Yet the modern approach to the 
Decision Act regards such forum shopping as equally problematic. 
 139. See supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text. 
 140. Hanna emphasized that only “substantial” or material differences were problematic. 
See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).  But that attempted revision only begs the 
question.  A party who loses because of differences between state and federal courts surely 
would view that difference as material. 
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3.  Forum Shopping Is Not an Inherent Evil 
The idea that forum shopping is inherently evil has become part of the 
received wisdom about Erie, especially after Hanna treated the 
discouragement of forum shopping as one of the doctrine’s driving 
forces.141  Scholars largely have accepted that received wisdom,142 even 
when they criticize the Erie doctrine on other grounds.143 
Despite the fact that courts have been decrying forum shopping for the 
better part of a century, it is not an evil in itself.144  At most, it is a symptom 
of a problem.  Sometimes forum shopping might be completely benign—
say, when an out-of-state lawyer prefers to litigate in federal court because 
she is more familiar with federal procedure.145  The incentive to forum shop 
stems from the uniformity of the FRCP throughout the country, and such 
uniformity, after all, was one of the FRCP’s goals.146  In at least one 
important respect, the notion of forum shopping is embedded in the 
Constitution.147  The whole point of diversity jurisdiction was to give out-
of-state litigants an unbiased forum that they might find more hospitable 
than a local state court.148 
Courts and scholars thus should resist the temptation to identify forum 
shopping and assume that that is the end of the matter; instead, they should 
probe the causes of forum shopping in a given context and figure out 
whether those causes are actually problematic.149  Erie did just that.  The 
Court explained that forum shopping resulted from what it believed was 
federal courts’ failure to respect the Constitution’s federalism limitations.  
Although that problem turned out to be illusory (or, perhaps more 
charitably, it no longer holds sway), the Court’s methodology at least was 
correct.  With that in mind, the question becomes whether forum shopping 
 
 141. See id. at 468. 
 142. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Semtek, Forum Shopping, and Federal Common 
Law, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1054–55 (2002); Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic 
Statutory Interpretation:  Methodology As “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 
1898, 1935, 1982 (2011); Steinman, supra note 58, at 299–301; see also Richard D. Freer & 
Thomas C. Arthur, The Irrepressible Influence of Byrd, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 61, 67 (2010) 
(arguing that Erie was concerned with “far more than the evils of forum shopping”). But see 
Redish & Phillips, supra note 35; Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1677 (1990). 
 143. See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 47, at 139 (treating forum shopping, and its attendant 
“[d]iscrimination,” as a necessary evil in a federal system). 
 144. Professor Ely acknowledged that point in passing. See Ely, supra note 3, at 710; see 
also Hart, supra note 127, at 512–13 (making a similar point but before the Court decided 
Hanna).  As I argue below, however, Professor Ely concluded erroneously that forum 
shopping was indicative of “simple unfairness.” See Ely, supra note 3, at 712; infra notes 
179–95 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 10, at 747. 
 146. See Burbank, supra note 88, at 1023–24, 1065–68. 
 147. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 148. See Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 119–21; see also 
Borchers, supra note 50, at 79–80. 
 149. See Note, supra note 142, at 1695 (“Forum shopping represents a continuum of 
activities within the legal universe; it cannot be dismissed merely as an evil to be avoided.”). 
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bespeaks any modern-day evil.  As the following subsections argue, it does 
not. 
4.  The Twin Aims’ Failure To Protect a Coherent Vision of Federalism 
The most plausible defense of the current twin aims analysis is that it 
protects a prudential version of federalism that is more deferential to state 
law than the Constitution requires.150  But the twin aims advance no such 
vision. 
The structural incoherence is exemplified by horizontal choice-of-law 
standards, which govern how states apply one another’s laws.  On matters 
within the twilight zone, state courts tend to be far less solicitous than their 
federal counterparts of other states’ laws.  Such lax horizontal choice-of-
law standards are not necessarily problematic; in fact, they often do a better 
job than the Erie doctrine of vindicating states’ principal interests in 
crafting conduct rules that regulate primary activity.  The broader point is 
that the mismatch between horizontal and vertical choice-of-law standards 
demonstrates that the Erie doctrine does not foster an identifiable or 
defensible version of federalism. 
Although the first prong of the twin aims analysis—avoiding forum 
shopping—often requires a federal court to apply state law, such an 
approach does not necessarily lead to greater respect for state prerogatives.  
By its own terms, Erie focused solely on vertical forum shopping (the 
choice between state and federal court) rather than horizontal forum 
shopping (the choice among different states).151  Hanna incorporated that 
same focus into the present Decision Act analysis.  While Erie, and now the 
Decision Act, arguably have fostered uniformity of substantive law within a 
given state, they also have led to greater divergence among the states.  
Although the twin aims analysis might combat vertical forum shopping, it 
has created incentives for litigants to engage in horizontal forum 
shopping—seeking out different law in different states.152  Neither Erie nor 
Hanna explained why vertical forum shopping is worse, or indicative of a 
greater problem, than horizontal forum shopping.  In both situations, a 
litigant chooses a particular forum with the hope of obtaining one set of 
laws to the exclusion of another. 
Horizontal forum shopping is a part of modern litigation.  To be sure, it 
probably was much more difficult when the Court decided Erie because 
defendants might not have been amenable to personal jurisdiction in more 
than one state.153  Today, however, many defendants—particularly large 
 
 150. See Ely, supra note 3, at 706 (arguing that although the Constitution does not 
embrace the “state enclave model” of federalism, Congress imposed that model through the 
Decision Act). 
 151. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 76 (1938). 
 152. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Real Risk of Forum Shopping:  A Dissent from Shady 
Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32 (2010); Sherry, supra note 47, at 138–39. 
 153. See Nelson, supra note 53, at 969. 
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corporations—are subject to personal jurisdiction in multiple states,154 
thereby affording plaintiffs an opportunity to choose the state in which to 
bring suit.  And the ability to choose where to litigate often entails the 
power to select a different set of substantive laws.155  In fact, lawyers have 
indicated that the applicable substantive law is among the factors that they 
consider when deciding where to litigate a case.156  Moreover, recent 
studies have shown that lawyers have changed their horizontal forum 
shopping habits in the wake of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005,157 
which enables defendants to remove class actions from state court to federal 
court more easily.  In the past, plaintiffs’ lawyers would bring suit in state 
courts known for being particularly plaintiff friendly.  Now, with the 
knowledge that the case likely will wind up in federal court, lawyers are 
bringing cases in federal courts at the outset, and they are choosing courts 
that are most sympathetic to class actions.158  That lawyers adapt their 
horizontal forum shopping to new legal structures underscores the existence 
of such behavior. 
One reason for the prevalence of horizontal forum shopping is the extent 
to which horizontal choice-of-law principles call for the application of 
forum law.  For instance, in the horizontal choice-of-law context, a state 
generally applies its own law regarding issues of “judicial administration,” 
i.e., rules prescribing the conduct of litigation.159  Among the vast swath of 
issues that pertain to judicial administration, and thus usually are governed 
by the forum state’s law, are discovery rules,160 costs and security for 
costs,161 the burdens of production162 and persuasion,163 the standard for 
sufficiency of the evidence,164 and statutes of limitation.165 
 
 154. See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–
57 (2011); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
 155. Admittedly, horizontal forum shopping will not always lead State A to apply 
different substantive law than State B.  Both states’ choice-of-law principles might call for 
the application of the same substantive law. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 
U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that in diversity cases federal courts must apply state choice-
of-law rules).  On the other hand, studies have demonstrated that a forum is “much more 
likely” to apply its own substantive law rather than a sister state’s law. Borchers, supra note 
152, at 32; see also Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum 
Law, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1266–74 (2011) (noting various presumptions counseling 
application of forum law); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive 
Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801, 830–31 (2010) (noting the historical pedigree of the lex fori 
approach—calling for application of forum law—to conflict of laws); Courtland H. Peterson, 
Proposals of Marriage Between Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 869, 
871 (1981). 
 156. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the 
Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529 (2010). 
 157. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
 158. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1593, 1611–14 (2008). 
 159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971). 
 160. See id. § 127 cmt. a.5. 
 161. See id. § 127 cmt. a.8. 
 162. See id. § 134. 
 163. See id. § 133. 
 164. See id. § 135. 
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In contrast, federal courts have much less latitude to apply their own law 
in the vertical choice-of-law context.  The modified outcome-determinative 
test prescribes a significantly stricter approach, militating against 
application of federal law regarding many of those same issues.166  
Consequently, there is a wide divergence between the approaches to 
horizontal and vertical choice of law. 
The mere existence of horizontal forum shopping does not undermine the 
federalism rationale for the twin aims approach so much as federal courts’ 
general indifference to it.167  The Supreme Court never has entertained a 
serious challenge to the horizontal choice-of-law principles that give states 
broad discretion to apply their own law regarding the issues discussed 
above, which all fall within the twilight zone.  Moreover, the Supreme 
Court has held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause168 and the Due Process 
Clause169 impose only nominal constraints on a state’s ability to apply its 
own substantive law to a dispute.170  And the Court has held that even when 
one state has an obligation to apply a sister state’s substantive law, the 
forum has broad discretion to interpret the sister state’s law.  Only the most 
blatant misinterpretation will violate the Constitution.171 
All of these aspects of horizontal choice of law—the preference for 
application of forum law regarding many issues in the twilight zone, the 
minimal constitutional constraints on states’ ability to apply their own law, 
and the existence of horizontal forum shopping—fundamentally undermine 
the idea that the twin aims protect a coherent vision of federalism.  It makes 
 
 165. See id. § 142.  Borrowing statutes, which direct the forum to apply the statute of 
limitations of the state that supplies the cause of action (if that statute of limitations is shorter 
than the forum’s), mitigate the potential for disparate outcomes. 
 166. See, e.g., Garcia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 209 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that state law governed an award of “actual costs”); United States ex rel. Newsham v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying a state’s anti-
SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) provisions regarding the dismissal of a 
lawsuit); Ashland Chem. Inc. v. Barco Inc., 123 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying state 
court rules regarding fees).  See also pre-Hanna cases that the Supreme Court has not 
repudiated. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (applying a state 
law requiring security of costs); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) 
(holding a state statute of limitations to be applicable). 
 167. The lax horizontal choice-of-law standards have been controversial. See Green, 
supra note 155; see also Borchers, supra note 152, at 32.  My objective here is not to take 
sides in that debate but rather to demonstrate the widely different standards that apply to 
vertical and horizontal federalism questions. 
 168. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 169. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 170. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (noting 
that the Constitution allows a state to choose its own law if there is “a significant contact or 
significant aggregation of contacts, . . . such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair”); see also id. at 320–32 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).  In 
Allstate, the decedent and his wife lived in Wisconsin, and he was involved in a fatal 
vehicular accident in Wisconsin with another Wisconsin resident.  A Minnesota court’s 
application of local law was permissible, though, based on contacts that were irrelevant to 
the accident—the decedent worked in Minnesota, and his widow later moved to Minnesota. 
See id. at 305. 
 171. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988). 
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little sense that the Decision Act would strive to protect federalism so 
painstakingly through vertical choice-of-law rules when horizontal choice-
of-law rules, free from almost all constraints, could undermine similar 
federalism values. 
Two rejoinders to the mismatch between vertical and horizontal choice of 
law seem possible, but neither is persuasive.  First, one might note that the 
Decision Act, as currently interpreted, protects vertical federalism more 
robustly than the Constitution does, whereas the lax restrictions on 
horizontal federalism derive solely from the Constitution.  Descriptively, 
that’s correct. But that argument cannot explain why the Court has 
construed the Decision Act as it has when such an interpretation does not 
represent a natural reading of the statute and is at odds with the almost 
negligible constraints that federalism imposes on horizontal choice-of-law 
principles.  As noted above, the text of the Decision Act says nothing about 
the twin aims.  Furthermore, it gives no indication that its use of the term 
“rule of decision” is so anomalous as to include any rule that might induce 
vertical forum shopping.172  In other words, the incongruity—beefed-up 
vertical federalism versus ineffectual horizontal federalism—is not 
compelled by the Decision Act and is instead of the Court’s own making.  
The explanation for the Court’s unnatural interpretation of the Decision Act 
thus seems less to do with a well-conceived notion of vertical or horizontal 
federalism than it does with the happenstance of grafting Erie’s 
constitutional analysis onto the statutory construction of the Decision Act. 
The second possible rejoinder is that the Constitution’s structure protects 
vertical federalism and is far less concerned about horizontal federalism.  
Professor David Marcus has noted that horizontal federalism “has an 
unclear relationship to the Constitution’s federalism architecture,” such that 
horizontal federalism, in a sense, is “false federalism.”173  Although the 
roots of horizontal federalism are less clear, it is a concept around which a 
rich literature has developed174 and that Congress recently embraced when 
it passed the Class Action Fairness Act.175  Moreover, while the Supreme 
Court has not always spoken clearly regarding horizontal federalism,176 the 
notion that states must respect one another’s sovereignty has clearly 
animated recent decisions regarding punitive damages177 and personal 
 
 172. See supra notes 133–38 and accompanying text. 
 173. Marcus, supra note 48, at 1298–99. 
 174. See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional 
Framework for the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75 (1984); Allan 
Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493 (2008); Scott Fruehwald, The 
Rehnquist Court and Horizontal Federalism:  An Evaluation and a Proposal for Moderate 
Constitutional Constraints on Horizontal Federalism, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 289 (2003); 
Green, supra note 155; Judith Resnik, Foreign As Domestic Affairs:  Rethinking Horizontal 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 
EMORY L.J. 31 (2007). 
 175. See Marcus, supra note 48, at 1297–99. 
 176. See Erbsen, supra note 174, at 501–02; Marcus, supra note 48, at 1299. 
 177. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 421–22 (2003); 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571–72 (1996). 
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jurisdiction.178  The point is not that vertical and horizontal federalism 
protect state sovereignty in precisely the same way but simply that 
horizontal federalism can provide meaningful protection of state 
prerogatives.  In light of that axiom, the Court’s jurisprudence is especially 
strange:  when it comes to vertical federalism, the federal government must 
bend over backwards to respect state sovereignty; with regard to horizontal 
federalism, though, one state has only the most minimal obligation to 
respect a sister state’s sovereignty. 
5.  The Twin Aims’ Failure To Protect a Coherent Personal Liberty Interest 
While the first of the twin aims (discouraging vertical forum shopping) 
fails to promote a rational structural view of federalism, the second aim 
(preventing inequitable administration of the laws)179 seeks to uphold 
nonexistent personal liberty interests.  Thus, on both fronts, the twin aims 
approach is incoherent. 
Erie and Hanna are replete with references to “inequity,” “unfairness,” 
and “discrimination.”  Erie referred to the situation in which out-of-staters 
could choose more favorable law in federal courts as “grave discrimination 
by noncitizens against citizens”180 and maintained that the discrimination 
had become “far-reaching.”181  Hanna quoted those passages approvingly 
as it argued that one of Erie’s principal purposes was to mitigate 
“inequitable administration of the laws.”182 
Erie’s holding that federal courts must apply state substantive law in 
diversity cases reflected a gut instinct that it is unfair for a lawsuit to have 
vastly different results depending on the forum.183  Although Erie and its 
progeny cloaked that instinct in federalism arguments, it remains little more 
than an intuition that does not withstand serious analysis. 
For all of the cases’ breathless language about unfairness and 
discrimination, nothing in the Constitution or the relevant statutes requires 
state and federal courts to reach the same results in any given case.  Hanna 
 
 178. The Court embraced horizontal federalism in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).  Two years later, in an opinion by Justice Byron White, 
who also authored World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court seemingly disavowed the notion that 
restrictions on personal jurisdiction derive from horizontal federalism. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).  More recently, 
though, the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 
2789 (2011), sought to reinvigorate horizontal federalism as part of the personal jurisdiction 
analysis. 
 179. See Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”:  Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, 
P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.:  The Rules Enabling Act Decision That Added to the 
Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 AKRON L. REV. 1147, 1168 n.135 (2011) (arguing that 
the “two parts of the formulation are only different sides of the same coin” since “forum-
shopping . . . is what caused the inequitable administration of the laws”). 
 180. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938). 
 181. Id. at 75. 
 182. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965); see also id. at 468 n.9; Note, supra 
note 142, at 1685. 
 183. See Ely, supra note 3, at 712–13. 
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recognized as much when it modified the outcome-determinative test.184  A 
more moderate formulation of the perceived inequality—that only 
substantial variations give rise to concerns of unfairness—is still 
conceptually problematic.  Virtually any variation can be dispositive, 
depending on when during the litigation the difference between the state 
and federal rules becomes relevant.  Sometimes those variations matter at 
the stage of primary activity.  Such was the case in Erie itself, in which 
federal and state law defined the negligence standard differently.185  At 
other times, the variation becomes manifest only at the beginning of 
litigation, when, for example, two courts apply different limitations 
periods.186  Those differences do not affect primary conduct (such as the 
actual accident in a tort action), but they can have a tremendous effect on 
the litigation at its inception.  Even differences that appear to have no 
influence on either primary conduct or forum selection can have “a marked 
effect upon the outcome of the litigation.”187  Such was the situation in 
Hanna when different rules governing service of process became relevant 
much later in the case.188 
Hanna treated a rule as significant for purposes of the Decision Act to the 
extent that it mattered at the start of litigation.  That exercise in line-
drawing sought to prevent forum shopping; it did not derive from some 
inherent notion of what makes a rule important or significant to the 
litigants.  Arguably, a better indicium of significance is whether a rule 
would affect people’s primary conduct choices.  In any event, the 
possibility that different courts—applying indisputably valid law—might 
lead to different, and even significantly different, results in a given case is a 
long way from rank discrimination. 
Discrimination is a loaded concept that has little, if any, applicability in 
the choice-of-law context.189  In law, invidious discrimination usually 
connotes predictable and intentional differentiation, often based on 
animus.190  Progressives, including Justice Brandeis, tended to regard 
diversity jurisdiction, and the ability to choose the general common law, as 
a privilege that systematically benefitted corporations or out-of-staters.191  
 
 184. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469. 
 185. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 70. 
 186. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  Another example includes 
rules governing whether a plaintiff may “stack” insurance claims (i.e., multiply damages 
based on the existence of multiple insurance policies covering a single loss). See Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 305 (1981). 
 187. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469. 
 188. See id. at 468–69. 
 189. Even some critics of Erie occasionally lapse into describing the application of 
different law as “discrimination.” See Sherry, supra note 47, at 139. 
 190. Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence relies heavily on this concept. See, e.g., Akins 
v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1945) (“A purpose to discriminate must be present which 
may be proven . . . by unequal application of the law to such an extent as to show intentional 
discrimination.”). 
 191. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:  
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 64–67, 155–62 (2000). 
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But no such systemic privilege existed, as the contours of any given case 
dictated which party stood to gain from application of general common law 
rather than state law.192  In fact, one of the ironies of Erie is that the Court, 
by rejecting the general common law in favor of Pennsylvania law, ruled in 
favor of a corporate defendant at the expense of a small-fry plaintiff. 
The multitude of situations in which courts do not reach exactly equal 
results demonstrates that discrimination is not necessarily at work when 
federal courts, sitting in diversity, do not behave exactly as state courts 
would.  In making discretionary decisions, judges often reach different 
conclusions.193  Different circuits might have different interpretations of the 
same law.194  And, as noted above, a state usually applies its own law 
regarding such issues as statutes of limitation and burdens of proof, even if 
such rules substantially affect how the forum state effectuates a sister state’s 
substantive law.195  Those differences do not rise to the level of 
discrimination.  In cases where duly constituted courts apply law enacted by 
democratically legitimate legislatures and executives—without bias toward 
any particular party or groups of people—“discrimination” is an 
inappropriate way to describe varied outcomes.196 
Consequently, the inequity that Erie perceived, and that Hanna enshrined 
in the twin aims analysis, is misplaced.  There is no good reason to believe 
that choice-of-law rules derive from systemic bias or work an invidious 
discrimination. 
6.  The Persistence of Vertical Forum Shopping 
Finally, I note briefly that the twin aims analysis neither has achieved its 
goal of eliminating vertical forum shopping (even if that were a coherent or 
laudable goal) nor created an easily administrable rule.  Federal courts 
sitting in diversity have found ways around applying state law that they find 
 
 192. See Sherry, supra note 47, at 138 (noting other cases in which state law, rather than 
federal general law, benefitted corporate litigants). 
 193. See, e.g., United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“Abuse of 
discretion review means ‘that the court has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be 
disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.’” 
(quoting Kern v. TXO Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984))). 
 194. Compare Skoog v. Cnty. of Clackamas, 469 F.3d 1221, 1232 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that plaintiff need not plead the absence of probable cause in order to state a claim 
of retaliatory arrest), Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 895 (6th Cir. 2002), and DeLoach v. 
Bevers, 922 F.2d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1990), with Dahl v. Holley, 312 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (holding that the absence of probable cause is required in retaliatory-arrest 
claims), Keenan v. Tejeda, 290 F.3d 252, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2002), Curley v. Village of 
Suffern, 268 F.3d 65, 73 (2d Cir. 2001), and Smithson v. Aldrich, 235 F.3d 1058, 1063 (8th 
Cir. 2000). 
 195. See supra notes 159–66 and accompanying text. 
 196. The only other possible source of discrimination is an opposing party who tries to 
gain a litigation advantage.  But use of a lawful litigation tactic by a party does not infringe a 
cognizable liberty interest and thus cannot amount to discrimination by a governmental 
entity. 
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antiquated or simply objectionable.197  For instance, they can treat state law 
as unsettled, such that the federal court may assume the authority to make 
an “Erie guess” as to how the highest court of the state would resolve the 
particular question presented by a case.198  On rare occasions, federal courts 
baldly refuse to follow state law with which they disagree.199 
Moreover, vertical forum shopping still happens.  Even when litigants 
know that federal courts will apply state substantive law, litigants often 
have a strong preference for one forum rather than another.  For instance, a 
plaintiff might want a particular jury pool.200  Such was the case in World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,201 one of the venerable personal 
jurisdiction cases that most civil procedure students read.  The plaintiffs 
sought to include two relatively minor defendants in the litigation in order 
to destroy diversity and thus keep the case out of federal court.  If that tactic 
had succeeded, the plaintiffs could have tried their lawsuit in state court in 
Creek County, Oklahoma, which had a reputation for outsize jury 
awards.202  The vertical forum shopping could not have been more 
transparent. 
Sometimes a plaintiff might assume that a state judge applying the law of 
his own state might apply that law more sympathetically than a federal 
judge.203  Although federal statutes prohibit litigants from manufacturing 
diversity (say, by moving to a state other than the defendant’s home 
state),204 litigants may destroy diversity by moving to or incorporating in 
the defendant’s home state.  And the frequency of litigation over tactics that 
destroy diversity suggests that vertical forum shopping has not become a 
relic of the pre-Erie past.205 
 
 197. See Sherry, supra note 47, at 141 & n.68 (noting that “federal courts have found 
ways to ignore state decisions” and citing cases demonstrating lack of intrastate uniformity). 
 198. See, e.g., Webber v. Sobba, 322 F.3d 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2003); see also Dolores 
K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 
78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1677–80 (1992) (noting the prevalence of “Erie guesses” and frequent 
errors by federal courts in predicting development of state law). 
 199. For example, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & 
Mining Co. held that the measure of damages is the cost of repair rather than the diminution 
of value. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla. 1962).  
Oklahoma state courts continue to adhere to this somewhat anomalous rule. See, e.g., 
Schneberger v. Apache Corp., 890 P.2d 847, 849–50 (Okla. 1994).  Several federal courts, 
however, explicitly decline to follow the rule when applying Oklahoma law. See, e.g., Davis 
v. Shell Oil Co., 795 F. Supp. 381, 385 (W.D. Okla. 1992) (citing Tenth Circuit precedent 
and stating that “[t]his Court likewise will not follow Peevyhouse”); see also Blackburn v. 
Del. PrimeEnergy Corp., No. CIV-91-664-W, 1992 WL 184071 (W.D. Okla. July 8, 1992) 
(declining to follow Peevyhouse). 
 200. See Borchers, supra note 156, at 533. 
 201. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 202. See Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson—The Rest of the 
Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1128 (1993). 
 203. See Marcus, supra note 48, at 1251–53 (arguing that Erie and CAFA both assumed 
that federal judges evince preferences for corporate defendants). 
 204. See 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2012). 
 205. See Go Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. C 05-03356 JSW, 2005 WL 3113068 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2005); see also Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969) 
(making a partial assignment to create diversity jurisdiction); Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 894 
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III.  THE GOALS OF A PROPOSED STATUTORY REVISION 
The preceding Parts have demonstrated that the current Erie doctrine, as 
applied in federal court, is problematic on a number of levels.  It does not 
advance any meaningful conception of structural interests, and it remains 
notoriously difficult to administer.  In this Part, I discuss objectives for a 
proposed statutory revision that resolves nearly all of those tensions.  A 
serious effort to effectuate these objectives could take many forms.  
Although the focus of this Part lies in conceptualizing how the various 
facets of the Erie doctrine should interact, Appendix A concretizes these 
ideas in actual statutory language.  I hasten to add, though, that the 
Appendix is simply a conversation starter for how drafters might implement 
the ideas developed in this Part. 
I begin by outlining the statute’s goals of unifying the various strands of 
the Erie doctrine and expanding federal courts’ power to regulate what I 
call nonsubstantive matters—purely procedural rules as well as the 
extensive twilight zone between substance and procedure.  I then explore 
why the revision makes sense both theoretically and practically, with 
reference to instructive concepts from administrative law. 
A.  The Statute’s Goals 
The statutory revision that I propose should accomplish three principal 
goals. 
First, the statute should define states’ actual federalism interests with 
greater specificity and clarify that federal courts are required to apply only 
truly substantive state law.  To do so, the statute should codify, in more 
direct language, the interpretation of the Decision Act from Erie itself—a 
federal court sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law.  That is 
the core of Erie, and regardless of whether one regards it as prudential or 
constitutionally compelled, it embodies important federalism ideals.  As I 
argue in the following section, allowing states to craft truly substantive law, 
and requiring federal courts sitting in diversity to apply such law, is a 
cognizable federalism interest. 
The trouble with the current approach to the Decision Act is that it calls 
for federal courts to apply much more than truly substantive state law, and 
it does so in a haphazard way that fails to effectuate a coherent policy.  The 
statutory revision would put an end to that practice.  It would eliminate the 
modified outcome-determinative test and the twin aims analysis that the 
Supreme Court has treated as the touchstone of the current Decision Act.  
Instead, the revised statute would focus on identifying substantive state law 
directed at primary activity. 
 
F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1990) (extending Kramer’s partial assignment ruling to a case in which 
the plaintiff attempted to destroy diversity); JMTR Enters., LLC v. Duchin, 42 F. Supp. 2d 
87 (D. Mass. 1999); Ivanhoe Leasing Corp. v. Texaco, Inc. 791 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Tex. 
1992); Douglas Energy of N.Y., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 585 F. Supp. 546 (D. Kan. 1984); 
Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161 (D. Me. 1969). 
3282 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
As a side benefit, the revision would remove a minor cloud of 
uncertainty.  Recent historical scholarship suggests that the Decision Act, as 
originally framed, might not have intended for federal courts to apply any 
particular state’s law but, instead, a body of American (rather than British) 
law.206  The revision would affirm Erie’s basic holding and finally dispense 
with the debate about Erie’s potentially dubious historical grounding. 
Second, I propose that the revised statute empower federal courts to 
create any general nonsubstantive rule.  That single, unified concept should 
replace the language of the current Enabling Act, which allows the Supreme 
Court “to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure,” provided that 
“[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”207  
As discussed above, pervasive uncertainty has characterized courts’ and 
scholars’ understanding of how the two phrases in the Enabling Act interact 
and thus the extent of the Court’s rulemaking powers.208 
By focusing on the concept of nonsubstantive rules, the proposed statute 
would make plain that courts may create any truly procedural rule and any 
rule that falls within the twilight zone.  The proposed statute defines courts’ 
rulemaking power in a negative way—a rule passes muster as long as it is 
not clearly substantive.  In so doing, the revision takes some pressure off of 
the substance-procedure dichotomy on which the Enabling Act now relies.  
Unlike the term “procedure,” as used in the current statute, the concept of 
nonsubstantive rules does not require an independent, a priori meaning.  
The proposed statute defines what qualifies as truly substantive law and 
then permits courts to adopt rules outside the purview of such law.  
Moreover, the generality requirement—prohibiting courts from adopting 
rules directed at specific kinds of cases—helps ensure that a court-adopted 
rule will not impinge on the elected branches’ power to declare substantive 
law.209 
By granting the federal courts power to craft any nonsubstantive rule, the 
proposal would extend such rulemaking power beyond its current limits.  
The Enabling Act, as presently understood, does not allow the Supreme 
Court to regulate statutes of limitation or preclusion questions; such matters 
have too many substantive undertones and thus are removed from the 
Court’s rulemaking domain.210  But early theorists of the substance-
procedure dichotomy recognized that those issues, as well as evidentiary 
questions, qualified as procedural.211  Precisely because those issues govern 
judicial administration, notwithstanding collateral effects on substantive 
 
 206. See RITZ, supra note 130, at 83–87; see also supra notes 130–32 and accompanying 
text. 
 207. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (emphasis added). 
 208. See supra Part II.A. 
 209. See infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text. 
 210. See Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks:  A Comment on Paul Carrington’s 
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1023–25 
(statute of limitations); Hendricks, supra note 10, at 128 (preclusion). 
 211. See D. Michael Risinger, “Substance” and “Procedure” Revisited:  With Some 
Afterthoughts on the Constitutional Problems of “Irrebuttable Presumptions,” 30 UCLA L. 
REV. 189, 196–97 (1982). 
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rights, the power to regulate them would fall within the ambit of the new 
statute. 
Consequently, the proposed statute adopts a true “arguably procedural” 
test that permits courts to regulate all matters that are not unambiguously 
substantive.  Although one formulation of the current Enabling Act test 
inquires whether an FRCP is “arguably procedural,” that description is 
incomplete and perhaps even wrong.212  Matters such as statutes of 
limitation and preclusion are “arguably procedural” for the reasons just 
discussed, but they presently lie outside the Court’s rulemaking power.  
Thus, the current Enabling Act places additional restrictions on that power 
(presumably based on the “substantive rights” limitation of § 2072(b), 
although the Court sometimes is cagey about that).  The proposed statute 
removes those other constraints and clarifies the capacious standard for 
assessing courts’ rulemaking authority. 
Third, the statute should expand the means by which federal courts may 
adopt nonsubstantive rules.  It would leave in place the basic Enabling Act 
structure, which empowers the Supreme Court, through formal 
rulemaking,213 to create general prospective rules of practice and procedure 
for the federal courts.  That process in many ways mirrors the rulemaking 
process followed by administrative agencies under the Administrative 
Procedure Act214 (APA).  Currently, the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules and the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
essentially solicit input regarding any proposed changes through a notice-
and-comment process.  The proposed revision to the FRCP then goes to the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, which, if it approves the proposal, 
forwards it to the Supreme Court.  The Court, in turn, transmits the proposal 
to Congress by May 1 of the year in which the new provision is to become 
effective.  If Congress takes no contrary action, the provision takes effect on 
December 1.215 
In addition to that formalized structure, which should remain the default 
method for adopting new rules, the statute should give courts the power to 
create rules through less formalized means.  Such additional avenues should 
include local rulemaking, which the Enabling Act already authorizes.216  
But courts’ rulemaking ability should extend further and allow the Supreme 
Court and lower courts to create other nonsubstantive rules interstitially 
 
 212. Professor Clermont has suggested that the “arguably procedural” test (Justice John 
Marshall Harlan’s words in Hanna) is more permissive than the “really regulates procedure” 
test from Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). See Clermont, supra note 42, at 1004–
06.  According to Professor Clermont, the former test captures the outer boundaries of 
Congress’s ability to prescribe rules for diversity cases, whereas the slightly more stringent 
“really regulates procedure” test governs the Enabling Act. See id. at 1016. 
 213. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071, 2073–2074, 2077 (2012). 
 214. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 215. See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:  Interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1103–04 (2002). 
 216. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071.  Consistent with the remainder of the proposal, Congress 
should repeal § 2071(f), which states that § 2071 is the exclusive means by which federal 
courts may promulgate local rules. 
3284 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
through the process of adjudication.  Such a delegation of common law–
making power would give the Supreme Court discretion to promulgate rules 
formally, to adopt them through adjudication as such rules become 
necessary, or to leave certain procedural matters within the discretion of the 
lower courts. 
Explicitly expanding the means by which federal courts may adopt 
procedural rules helps effectuate the statute’s broader mandate.  It allows 
federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, to adapt to unforeseen 
situations and fill procedural gaps.  Moreover, as some scholars recognize, 
the Supreme Court already engages in common law rulemaking.217  By 
bringing greater candor to that legitimate process, the statute would foster 
better decisionmaking and greater dialogue between courts, rulemakers, and 
Congress. 
B.  Protecting a Coherent Vision of Federalism 
One of the statute’s major accomplishments would be the clarification of 
what, until now, has been an amorphous notion of federalism running 
through the Erie doctrine.  My proposal promotes a coherent view of 
federalism as a commitment to protecting states’ interest in creating 
positive law that directly regulates individual conduct.  That vision of 
federalism, though not constitutionally compelled,218 seeks to protect 
concrete state interests as a prudential matter. 
As I have argued in earlier work, a government’s authority to “craft[] 
conduct rules is the preeminent power and the one that deserves the most 
rigorous protection.”219  Conduct rules govern primary rights, obligations, 
and prohibitions, and they usually include the elements of a cause of action 
and defenses that respond directly to those elements.220  This is not to say 
that states do not care about the process of adjudicating those conduct rules, 
but such concern should not be a cognizable federalism interest when a 
federal court sits in diversity. 
The primacy of the power to enact conduct rules, and the usual 
reservation of that power to democratically accountable actors, is an idea 
interwoven through the Erie doctrine.  Indeed, the doctrine’s various 
sources—the Constitution, the Decision Act, and the Enabling Act—have 
differentiated between substance and procedure, albeit by drawing the line 
in different places.221  The current proposal seeks to refocus the Erie 
doctrine on the conduct rules that embody states’ regulatory choices and 
thus reflect their most salient federalism interests. 
 
 217. See Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of 
Civil Procedure:  Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188 (2012). 
 218. See supra notes 43–57 and accompanying text. 
 219. See Alan M. Trammell, Jurisdictional Sequencing, 47 GA. L. REV. 1099, 1142 
(2013). 
 220. See id. at 1136–37. 
 221. See Ely, supra note 3, at 697–700. 
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The proposed statute simultaneously recognizes federal courts’ interest in 
impartially maintaining control over their own methods of judicial 
administration.  For these reasons, the statute authorizes courts to create any 
nonsubstantive rule—i.e., one that actually regulates judicial administration.  
It eschews the term “procedure” in order to avoid confusion with the 
Enabling Act’s scope and to clarify that courts’ rulemaking authority now 
encompasses all matters within the twilight zone.  Accordingly, the notion 
of “nonsubstantive” rules is broader than almost any working definition of 
“procedural” rules.222  The fact that a nonsubstantive rule has collateral 
substantive effects is, without more, unproblematic.  The relevant question 
is whether the rule directly regulates a matter of judicial administration; if it 
does, then it passes muster.223 
This prudential vision of federalism (and, to a certain extent, separation 
of powers), is rooted in a functional theory of those structural interests.  
Professor Victoria Nourse has argued that such interests fundamentally 
address “risks to the decisionmaking relations between the people and their 
government.”224  In other words, the diffusion of power among the states 
and the various branches of the federal government reflects an implicit 
judgment about which constituencies, through their representatives, should 
make certain decisions.  Accordingly, any allocation of decisionmaking 
authority should be sensitive to the risk of upsetting the “representative 
relation.”225 
Viewed through that lens, the proposed statute relies on the basic 
democratic assumption that the people’s direct representatives should craft 
substantive laws that announce the rules governing daily life.226  By 
contrast, appointed judges presumptively should not be in the business of 
making such conduct rules.  That presumption can be overcome, of course, 
but the federal courts’ power to create substantive common law is narrowly 
circumscribed227 precisely because shifting such power to judges risks a 
drastic change in the representative relation. 
 
 222. See Trammell, supra note 219, at 1140. 
 223. In one sense, decoupling substantive and procedural rules is artificial.  Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s “bad man” theory of the law argued that a person is not interested in the 
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and enforcement mechanisms. See Mulligan, supra note 135, at 244–48.  Moreover, the 
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On the other hand, the risk analysis points the other way regarding rules 
of judicial administration.  Unlike conduct rules, which convey policy 
judgments about how people should behave in society, nonsubstantive rules 
strive to implement a predictable system that enforces conduct rules.  
Nonsubstantive rules do not directly implicate the representative relation for 
several reasons.  First, such rules are not presumptively the domain of 
democratically accountable representatives.  To the contrary, the federal 
judiciary long has enjoyed the presumption that it is competent to regulate 
such matters and may do so absent congressional interference.  Moreover, 
courts have a reserve of inherent power that even Congress may not 
abridge.228  Second, the risk of disuniformity and unpredictability in federal 
procedure far outweighs any minimal concern about courts’ insulation from 
popular sentiment regarding those procedural questions.  Finally, the very 
nature of diversity jurisdiction reflects an assumption that decoupling 
conduct rules (which in diversity cases usually come from states) from 
federal procedure (which at times might lead to different outcomes) will not 
disturb vital structural interests.229 
The framework overlaying the proposed statute is premised on the idea 
that the difference between substance and procedure is both meaningful and 
discernible.  Scholars and judges long have recognized that the distinction 
is far from precise.  At the extreme end of legal realism, several scholars in 
the early twentieth century argued that any distinction between substance 
and procedure was meaningless and illusory.230  More charitable critics, 
including Professor Walter Wheeler Cook, observed that an inherent and 
crisp line did not demarcate the two concepts, thus leading to his 
memorable description of the wide “no-man’s land, the twilight zone” 
between substance and procedure.231  Even one of the architects of the 
FRCP, Professor Charles Clark, described the substance-procedure 
dichotomy as “shadowy at best.”232  But scholars like Professors Cook and 
Clark recognized that the line, however elusive, can be useful as long as its 
purpose is clear.233  The insight of focusing on why the dichotomy matters 
in a particular context has enabled scholars and lawyers to have productive 
discussions about substance and procedure. 
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Scholarship on the Enabling Act in particular has grappled with the 
overarching question of what purpose the distinction serves,234 especially 
because the Enabling Act expressly invokes the dichotomy.235  Despite 
asking the right questions, though, such scholarship is almost doomed to 
yield inconclusive answers.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the legal reform movement conceptualized substantive and 
procedural law as mutually exclusive.  Procedure, in the minds of some 
legal scientists, was value neutral and capable of reformation.236  
Consequently, because many reformers thought that substance and 
procedure operated in distinct realms, they failed to appreciate the 
significant overlap between the two. 
With a more sophisticated understanding of how substance and procedure 
interact, recent scholarship has elucidated the dichotomy’s continuing 
relevance for purposes of the Erie doctrine and the role of federal courts, in 
particular.  Those insights inform the substance-procedure dichotomy on 
which I rely and help explain the allocation of power in the proposed 
statute.  Specifically, my proposal draws the line between conduct rules and 
nonsubstantive rules in a new and innovative way that homes in on states’ 
preeminent interest in regulating primary behavior. 
Professor Jennifer Hendricks has explored the state-level benefits that 
derive from distinguishing between substance and procedure in the Erie 
context.  “Separating substance from procedure, artificial as it may be in 
some senses, has the virtue of requiring the legislature to speak as clearly as 
possible in the substantive law.”237  A regime that provides a wide berth for 
federal courts to regulate procedure does not usurp state prerogatives; 
rather, it fosters candor among elected officials by discouraging state 
legislators from masking their policy choices within procedural garb.238  
Moreover, the dichotomy, as represented in the proposed statute, provides 
clarity and predictability that are wanting in the current Erie doctrine.  Not 
only does the proposed statute encourage greater candor from state 
lawmakers, it also conveys a firmer commitment to protecting states’ 
interest in regulating conduct.  At the same time, the statute promotes 
greater predictability with respect to the application of federal procedure, 
which no longer would be subject to displacement by state procedures. 
The proposed statute admittedly will call for the application of state law 
less often than does the current Erie doctrine, but that change does not 
undermine federalism principles.  The current approach to the Decision Act, 
with its focus on the twin aims, respects state law to the extent that variance 
between federal and state rules influences a litigant’s choice of forum.  As 
 
 234. See, e.g., Burbank & Wolff, supra note 84; Burbank, supra note 88, at 1107–08; 
Kelleher, supra note 89, at 182; Redish & Murashko, supra note 89. 
 235. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a)–(b) (2012); see also Ely, supra note 3, at 723–24. 
 236. See David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal 
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 397–98 (2010); Redish & Amuluru, supra note 
118, at 1311; see also Bone, supra note 118, at 896. 
 237. Hendricks, supra note 10, at 146. 
 238. See id. at 138–40; see also Clermont, supra note 42, at 1017. 
3288 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
discussed above, a state’s interest in which court a party chooses pales in 
comparison to two other state interests—the actual outcome of litigation 
and the regulation of conduct at the primary stage of activity.239  Moreover, 
the current doctrine protects federalism interests in the context of the 
Enabling Act even more obliquely.  For instance, the Court has 
demonstrated great solicitude for state law in some contexts (for example, 
allowing state law rather than the FRCP to determine whether filing or 
service of a complaint tolls the running of a statute of limitations).240  On 
the other hand, the Court has refused to vindicate what appears to be a far 
greater state interest regarding the availability (or unavailability) of class 
actions to enforce certain claims.241  Although there might be good reasons 
why the cases come out as they do, often turning on what the Court 
perceives to be the scope of the FRCP at issue, the current approach 
protects states’ interests in haphazard and unpredictable ways.  By contrast, 
my proposal actually strengthens a commitment to federalism by 
delineating more precisely what federalism protects and how states can 
more predictably ensure that federal courts will respect their substantive 
policies. 
Precisely because the proposed statute affords federal courts greater 
discretion to craft and apply nonsubstantive rules, federalism concerns 
require that courts not abuse that authority.  One touchstone for identifying 
whether a court has exercised its power properly, or whether a rule is too 
substantive and thus violates federalism principles, is trans-substantivity.  
The Enabling Act aspired to create a set of rules that would apply in all 
federal cases, regardless of a lawsuit’s underlying substance.  Professor 
Marcus has argued that trans-substantivity is not simply a value that 
promotes uniformity and ease of administration.  Instead, the concept 
captures what Professor Clark described as a policy commitment to the 
proper division of power between the elected branches and the federal 
courts.242  That insight regarding the current Enabling Act applies equally 
to the proposed statute.  When a court adopts a trans-substantive rule, there 
is a much stronger presumption that the rule is nonsubstantive.  Any of its 
substantive effects are most likely collateral and unproblematic for purposes 
of the allocation of authority.  By contrast, if a court promulgates a rule that 
does not apply across all areas of substantive law, a much greater concern 
exists that the court has exercised nominally procedural powers in order to 
regulate substantive matters.243 
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*  *  * 
The substance-procedure dichotomy, while defined in a new way, is an 
essential tenet of the proposed statute because it effectuates concrete 
federalism interests, albeit ones that are prudential rather than 
constitutional.  It strengthens the representative relationship between the 
people and conduct rules while affording federal courts greater control over 
their own procedure.  Even though substance and procedure are not 
immutable terms and might not always lead to easy classification of 
particular issues, they usefully capture important policy commitments.  
First, unlike the current doctrine, the statute relies on the dichotomy to 
protect states’ identifiable and preeminent interest in regulating primary 
behavior through the creation of conduct rules.244  Second, the dichotomy 
encourages state lawmakers to make their policy preferences clear through 
substantive law rather than specialized procedures.  In so doing, the 
dichotomy allows federal courts to identify and respect those choices more 
readily and also fosters ease of administration.  Finally, the dichotomy 
identifies the nonsubstantive matters, usually concerning judicial 
administration, that federal courts legitimately may regulate.  As long as 
courts do not stray into regulating conduct as such, they will respect the 
federalism limits that the statute embodies. 
C.  (Re)unifying the Doctrine 
At a theoretical level, the statute unifies (or, perhaps more appropriately, 
reunifies) the Erie doctrine.  In the years between Erie and Hanna, the 
Supreme Court had generally approached the doctrine in an undifferentiated 
way.245  The problem was not the desire to fashion a unified doctrine.  
Rather, as Hanna noted, the earlier unified approach had become untenable 
because of the Court’s extreme deference to state law through the outcome-
determinative test, which threatened to make the FRCP virtually 
impotent.246  Hanna correctly seized on precedents that counseled 
deference to the FRCP, cabined the reach of the outcome-determinative test, 
and deemphasized the role of the Constitution in Erie questions.247  For all 
of the difficulties that Hanna caused, many of which I have discussed in the 
previous Parts, Hanna’s differentiation of the three sources of the Erie 
doctrine was necessary in its time. 
There is much to commend a unified approach, though.  From a practical 
perspective, courts and litigants will have to negotiate a single test, rather 
than the current multiplicity of tests that draw lines between substance and 
procedure in different and sometimes idiosyncratic ways.  If streamlining 
 
 244. See Marcus, supra note 236, at 380 (noting the traditional definition of a substantive 
rule as one that “characteristically and reasonably affect[s] people’s conduct at the stage of 
primary private activity”). 
 245. See Henry Paul Monaghan, John Ely:  The Harvard Years, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1748, 
1749 n.5 (2004). 
 246. See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra notes 34–60 and accompanying text. 
3290 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
the analysis and eliminating the “twin aims” approach to the Decision Act 
were the only goals of a statutory revision, one solution might be to impose 
the current Enabling Act standards onto the Decision Act.  While that 
solution would tidy up much of the current complexity in the Erie doctrine, 
it would fall short of achieving other goals. 
The proposed statute does not merely streamline the Erie analysis; it also 
expands the realm of nonsubstantive issues that federal courts may regulate.  
Such an expansion would alleviate most of the problems elucidated in Part 
II.  As discussed above, this approach is consistent with a structural vision 
of Erie’s principal purpose.  It reserves to the states the power to craft truly 
substantive law—conduct rules—and thereby vindicates a coherent notion 
of federalism by protecting the preeminent power exercised by the federal 
and state governments.248  The other side of that coin is that federal courts 
may regulate any nonsubstantive matters, broadly defined.  By expanding 
federal courts’ rulemaking powers, a unified test also fosters predictability 
and uniformity in several important respects. 
First, the proposed statute would make clear that federal rules, as long as 
they are not clearly substantive, would apply in diversity cases without 
exception.  Under the current regime, even when an FRCP is sufficiently 
procedural to pass muster under the Enabling Act, the Supreme Court 
continues to give certain FRCP an unnaturally, even implausibly, narrow 
construction.249  Consequently, the same FRCP might have one meaning in 
a diversity case but another meaning in a federal-question case, a state of 
affairs that has engendered pointed scholarly criticism.250  The statutory 
revision would alleviate that anomaly. 
Second, and in a similar vein, the revision would avoid the contentious 
battles of recent years in which the Supreme Court has debated whether 
contrary state procedural law may trump an FRCP.  Shady Grove was the 
most recent such case.  The justices disagreed whether Rule 23, governing 
class actions, should yield to New York’s proscription of class actions when 
the claims at issue fell below a certain monetary threshold.251  Rule 23 does 
not regulate a clearly substantive matter, a point on which the otherwise 
divided Court agreed.252  Under my proposal, that would be the end of the 
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inquiry, and Shady Grove would have been an easy case.  Because Rule 23 
is a valid exercise of the Court’s rulemaking power, it should apply without 
exception and not be subject to narrowing by contrary state law. 
Third, the expanded scope of judicial rulemaking would avoid situations, 
such as Gasperini, in which the Court carved up and spliced together 
certain features of the state and federal standards of review for particular 
jury awards.253  The complexity and unpredictability of such an approach 
has proved notoriously difficult for lower courts to apply.254  Again, in the 
absence of concrete federalism interests, such complexity and 
unpredictability are unnecessary.  To the contrary, the approach of cases 
like Gasperini undermines the uniformity of the FRCP. 
Finally, the proposed statute would alleviate the uncertainty of as-applied 
challenges to the FRCP.  If a nonsubstantive rule is valid under the 
proposed statute, it should apply broadly and consistently.  The statute 
accomplishes this goal by eliminating the language that some courts and 
scholars have invoked to justify as-applied challenges under the Enabling 
Act.255 
The potential for as-applied challenges under the current system has 
created uncertainty but few, if any, corresponding benefits.  Some scholars 
have argued that such challenges are unproblematic.256  Professor Catherine 
Struve has noted that the Supreme Court always has entertained certain 
kinds of as-applied challenges to the FRCP and that those challenges have 
not unduly compromised the goal of uniformity.  Even if there has not been 
unmitigated chaos, the fact remains that such challenges reduce 
predictability for litigants and consume judicial resources.  Recent decisions 
essentially have signaled that the Supreme Court is increasingly receptive to 
as-applied challenges,257 but to no useful end.  Such challenges do not serve 
actual federalism interests, nor do they protect individual liberty.  Although 
the uncertainty of as-applied challenges in the context of clearly substantive 
rights—conduct rules—might be a price worth paying in order to allow 
people to understand and enforce their primary rights and responsibilities, 
an analogy to the procedural context is inapposite.258  As-applied 
challenges to nonsubstantive rules usually are a post hoc attempt to gain a 
litigation advantage rather than an effort to protect settled expectations 
about rights and responsibilities.  Consequently, the broad application of 
nonsubstantive rules under the proposed statute fosters predictability 
without undermining significant countervailing interests. 
In short, a unified standard to govern nonsubstantive matters in federal 
court would foster uniformity and predictability.  It also would recognize 
the federal judiciary’s legitimate interest in controlling its own 
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administration and procedure.  In effect, it captures the converse of an 
axiom that Professor Hart expressed pithily sixty years ago259:  state law 
should take the federal courts as it finds them. 
D.  The Advantages of Discretion in Rulemaking 
In addition to unifying the Erie analysis and expanding judicial power to 
create nonsubstantive rules, the statute gives federal courts greater 
discretion to choose the manner by which they craft such rules.  Lessons 
from administrative law demonstrate that such flexibility is desirable as a 
policy matter, particularly with regard to the nonsubstantive questions about 
which federal courts have expertise.  Such discretion fosters the prominent 
role that the statute envisions for courts in crafting nonsubstantive rules, 
allows courts to adapt to unanticipated circumstances, and promotes greater 
candor. 
1.  Common Law Rulemaking by Federal Courts Today 
In an important sense, federal courts already adopt procedural rules 
through case-by-case adjudication.  As a formal matter, though, the 
Enabling Act envisions that the Supreme Court may adopt procedural rules 
only through a process that resembles notice-and-comment rulemaking by 
administrative agencies.260  On the other hand, as recent scholarship has 
elucidated, federal courts also craft procedural rules through the process of 
adjudication.261 
Perhaps the most prominent example of such common law rulemaking 
through adjudication is the new pleading standard under Rule 8(a).  The text 
of the rule provides that a pleading need contain only “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”262  For 
decades, the Supreme Court had emphasized that under a liberal regime of 
notice pleading, Rule 8(a) meant that a pleading was sufficient unless it 
“appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in 
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”263  Yet in 2007, the 
Supreme Court devised a new test that requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that her factual allegations are actually “plausible.”264  As scholars have 
recognized, the plausibility standard essentially created a heightened 
pleading standard for all complaints and was untethered to either the text of 
Rule 8(a) or any existing precedents.265  In essence, the Court crafted a new 
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rule through adjudication.  Because the plausibility standard was a policy 
innovation, rather than a purely legal interpretation of Rule 8(a),266 many 
scholars have argued that the Court should have adopted the new pleading 
standard only through the Enabling Act’s formalized rulemaking process.267 
Another example comes from the rules of joinder, which seek to create 
efficiencies by bringing together different claims and parties in the same 
lawsuit.  The FRCP that govern joinder generally require a fairly minimal 
showing of “commonality,” such as the presence of a “common question of 
law or fact.”268  According to Professor Robin Effron, courts have 
responded to fairly lax joinder requirements by devising “shadow rules” 
that identify situations in which joinder will (or will not) lead to the desired 
efficiencies.269  For instance, courts often insist that various claims should 
not simply evince a common question of law or fact; rather, they often 
apply a rule of “implied predominance,” requiring that the commonalities 
actually outweigh the differences between the claims.270  After careful 
analysis of several shadow rules, Professor Effron concludes, much like 
scholars who have analyzed the new plausibility pleading standard, that 
federal courts have not merely reached disparate interpretations of any 
given FRCP.  Instead, through case-by-case adjudication, courts have 
created new rules that govern joinder decisions.271 
2.  Analogy to Agency Discretion in Adopting Procedural Rules 
Unlike federal courts, administrative agencies enjoy explicit discretion to 
adopt new rules either through notice-and-comment rulemaking or through 
case-by-case adjudication.  Comparisons between court rulemaking and 
agency practice seem especially apt now that federal courts, and the 
Supreme Court in particular, effectively have assumed the power to craft 
new procedural rules through both adjudication as well as the formal 
rulemaking process outlined by the Enabling Act.  Until a recent 
contribution by Professors Lumen Mulligan and Glen Staszewski, this 
potentially fruitful analogy to administrative law had gone largely 
unexplored.272 
The analogy begins with reference to one of the seminal cases in 
administrative law, the second iteration of SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery 
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II).273  In that case, the Supreme Court declared that an agency has wide 
latitude to choose how it announces a new rule—either through the 
rulemaking process or in the course of adjudicating a case.274  To be sure, 
the difference between adjudication and rulemaking can be stark.  In an 
adjudication, an agency can promulgate a new substantive policy without 
having given prior notice to the public or even the affected party.  By 
contrast, the rulemaking process requires an agency to provide notice of its 
intent to adopt a new prospective rule, solicit public comments on the 
proposal, and offer reasons for why it has adopted the rule.  Despite those 
critical differences, Chenery II recognized that the formal protections of the 
rulemaking process might not be desirable or feasible in all instances.  
Unexpected problems arise, an agency does not always have sufficient 
expertise to create a generally applicable rule, and an agency might confront 
a narrow, particularized problem.  In those situations, a formal rule might 
be inadvisable or unnecessary.275 
Although Chenery II remains good law, such that agencies retain 
significant discretion to craft new substantive policies either through 
rulemaking or adjudication,276 it has attracted significant scholarly 
criticism.  Specifically, scholars have argued in favor of the superiority of 
rulemaking over adjudication, insofar as rulemaking usually is more 
transparent and fosters participatory values.277  Despite that preference, 
administrative law scholars have recognized the continuing salience of 
discretion and argued that without such discretion the administrative state 
would come to a grinding halt, crippled by the inability to act only through 
the cumbersome rulemaking process.278 
Professors Mulligan and Staszewski rely heavily on the analogy to 
Chenery II and, in particular, modern criticism that overwhelmingly favors 
rulemaking over adjudication.  In light of the superiority of rulemaking in 
the agency context, they argue that courts, when adopting new procedural 
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rules, also should adhere to a strong presumption in favor of rulemaking 
rather than adjudication.  Such notice-and-comment procedures allow 
greater public participation and debate about the choices that will govern 
federal adjudication.  They identify several factors that militate in favor of 
rulemaking, including the presence of policy considerations that apply 
broadly beyond the context of a given case.279  But they also recognize the 
occasional utility of adopting rules through adjudication.280 
Although many of the conclusions by Professors Mulligan and 
Staszewski make good policy sense, the analogy that they draw to 
administrative law is at least incomplete.  They are correct to identify the 
modern preference for rulemaking when agencies adopt new substantive 
rules.  But they err in equating such substantive rulemaking by agencies 
with federal courts’ adoption of procedural rules (or, in the parlance of my 
proposed statute, nonsubstantive rules).281 
In many ways, the better analogy is not to Chenery II, which gives 
agencies discretion in terms of how they promulgate new substantive rules, 
but to the Administrative Procedure Act,282 which expressly permits 
agencies to adopt “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” 
without having to go through notice-and-comment rulemaking.283  An 
agency thus has almost unfettered latitude to adopt procedural rules—
through rulemaking or adjudication, or simply by issuing them.  For all of 
the criticism that Chenery II has garnered with respect to the means by 
which agencies adopt substantive rules, the APA’s lax standards for the 
adoption of procedural rules have been decidedly uncontroversial.284  
Indeed, I am aware of no debate about an agency’s choice of how to adopt 
procedural rules. 
Although the scope of rules that qualify as procedural under the APA 
might be narrower than my definition of nonsubstantive rules, any daylight 
between the two concepts appears to be slight.  As the D.C. Circuit has 
recognized, a rule still qualifies as procedural for purposes of the APA, and 
need not go through the notice-and-comment process, even if the rule has 
an impact on substantive rights.  Instead, the question is “whether the 
agency action . . . encodes a substantive value judgment or puts a stamp of 
approval or disapproval on a given type of behavior.”285  At a conceptual 
 
 279. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 217, at 1215. 
 280. See id. at 1213–15, 1223. 
 281. See id. at 1228, 1231 n.262. 
 282. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.). 
 283. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
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Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000). 
 285. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also id. 
(noting that the D.C. Circuit has “move[d] away from looking solely into the substantiality 
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level, such a definition tracks the distinction that I have drawn between 
clearly substantive rules that seek to regulate conduct and a residual 
category of nonsubstantive rules. 
Finally, the analogy between courts, as rulemakers, and administrative 
agencies is sound because federal courts, like agencies, have particular 
expertise in the areas calling for the exercise of discretion—judicial 
administration.  Courts and judges are familiar with practices that govern 
litigation, and the current rulemaking process recognizes as much.  The 
Advisory Committee consists of a broad range of judges from all levels of 
the judiciary as well as practitioners.286 
3.  The Statute’s Incorporation of Judicial Discretion  
in Adopting Procedural Rules 
The proposed statute draws on the lessons from the administrative law 
context and federal courts’ recent experience in crafting procedural rules 
through adjudication.  It includes two essential elements:  first, it creates a 
presumption in favor of adopting nonsubstantive rules through the current 
rulemaking processes; second, it expressly introduces a new element of 
flexibility by empowering courts to adopt rules in the course of 
adjudication. 
The presumption in favor of rulemaking, while significantly less rigid 
than the one Professors Mulligan and Staszewski envision, draws on many 
of the scholarly insights about the advantages of rulemaking.  Most 
conspicuously, notice-and-comment rulemaking gives advance warning to 
the various stakeholders and fosters meaningful participation by those 
constituencies.  It also creates transparency and thus reduces the element of 
surprise to litigants in any given case.287  Moreover, rulemaking allows 
courts to craft comprehensive solutions—such as rewriting a rule entirely—
whereas adjudication simply does not allow for overarching structural 
changes to a procedural regime.288  For these reasons, the statute does not 
disturb either the current process by which the Supreme Court, with the 
assistance of the Advisory Committee, promulgates prospective rules for 
the entire federal court system or the mechanism by which individual courts 
may adopt prospective local rules. 
In addition to the current rulemaking process, the statute introduces new 
flexibility so that courts may adopt rules in the course of adjudication in 
order to respond to unforeseen circumstances or other exigencies.289  When 
 
of the impact” because “even unambiguously procedural measures affect parties to some 
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 286. See Struve, supra note 215, at 1109. 
 287. See supra note 277 and accompanying text. 
 288. See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 217, at 1210–11; Struve, supra note 215, at 
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wide latitude to implement the law’s substantive commands. See Marcus, supra note 236, at 
386–90 (citing 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, Scotch Reform, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 1, 
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courts create nonsubstantive rules through adjudication, they primarily 
should do so interstitially.  By explicitly conferring such power on federal 
courts, the statute recognizes that gap filling is often necessary and seeks to 
promote greater candor when courts need to exercise such power. 
With this framework in mind, I offer a few preliminary thoughts about 
how the proposed statute would regard three instances in which agencies 
and courts have adopted nonsubstantive rules.  The first, from the 
administrative law context, in some ways is the easiest.  In 1995, the 
Securities Exchange Commission adopted a comprehensive revision to its 
Rules of Practice, rules that govern adjudication much like the FRCP 
govern litigation in federal court.290  The Commission observed that such 
rules fell within the ambit of procedural rules that the APA exempts from 
notice-and-comment procedures.  Nevertheless, it recognized that the 
comprehensive nature of the revisions counseled the use of notice-and-
comment to solicit public participation.291  To my mind, that 
unquestionably was the correct choice and the one that the proposed statute 
clearly would favor if the same situation arose in the judicial context, as the 
Commission was revising its entire procedural regime. 
Second, the statute would approve at least some of the shadow rules of 
joinder.  This is one example in which the presumption that I envision 
would be less rigid than that proposed by Professors Mulligan and 
Staszewski.292  For many of the reasons that Professor Effron discusses, the 
joinder rules, as embodied in the current FRCP, do not necessarily lead to 
desirable or predictable outcomes.293  Professor Effron has elucidated the 
possibilities and pitfalls of shadow rules that respond to those deficiencies.  
In many ways, the breadth of the joinder rules invites judges to exercise 
discretion and, in common law fashion, figure out when the joinder of 
certain parties and claims will lead to more efficient litigation.294  That 
exercise of common law powers seems legitimate.  But when exercising 
delegated discretion, a court has a concomitant responsibility to justify its 
decisions and “persuade other courts that it has come to the correct 
decision.”295  Under the present regime, though, judges indulge the fiction 
that they are not creating a new rule.296  The proposed statute would 
improve the status quo by encouraging courts to identify situations in which 
they need to craft a gap-filling rule and then to do so with greater candor.  
Such explicit reasoning has the potential to promote dialogue among courts 
and thereby alleviate the unpredictability and disuniformity characteristic of 
common law rulemaking that occurs in the shadows. 
 
 290. See Rules and Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 32,738 (June 23, 1995) (codified at 
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 293. See Effron, supra note 261, at 772–73. 
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 296. See id. at 802. 
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Finally, I confess a degree of ambivalence about how the proposed 
statute would regard the new plausibility pleading standard discussed 
above.  On the one hand, the plausibility standard is an attempt, through 
adjudication, to give greater content to a broad rule—Rule 8(a)—that 
requires a pleading to contain no more than a “short and plain 
statement.”297  On the other hand, I sympathize with those who argue that 
the plausibility standard was not a gap-filling measure but, instead, akin to a 
significant revision of the notice-pleading regime.298  My tentative 
conclusion is that the latter arguments are more persuasive and that, if any 
such changes were necessary or desirable, the notice-and-comment 
rulemaking process would have been the appropriate avenue. 
E.  Anticipated Objections 
Although I have considered a number of possible objections throughout 
the Article, I briefly address three other potential concerns about the 
viability or desirability of the proposed statutory revision. 
1.  Is the Statute Unconstitutional? 
In light of Erie’s firm conviction that its holding was constitutionally 
compelled, one might query whether a statute that expands federal courts’ 
lawmaking power is constitutional. 
a.  Federalism Concerns 
As discussed in Part I, Erie proffered two related theories of 
constitutional federalism in support of its argument that the Swift regime 
had been unconstitutional, but scholars now recognize that neither justifies 
Erie.  First, the separate-sovereigns view of federalism long has been 
discredited and has no explanatory power.  Second, although the 
enumerated-powers explanation might apply to a sliver of cases (preventing 
the federal government from regulating certain issues that nonetheless 
might come into federal court through diversity jurisdiction), Erie is a gross 
overreaction to a fairly small problem.299  Consequently, modern 
scholarship overwhelmingly rejects these constitutional federalism 
arguments. 
b.  Separation of Powers Concerns 
In light of the waning enthusiasm for the federalism rationale, the 
dominant constitutional justification in the literature is based on separation 
of powers (or, judicial federalism).  The argument comes in a number of 
forms, but in essence it regards Erie as a limitation on federal courts’ ability 
to impinge on powers that belong to the elected branches.  According to this 
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 298. See supra notes 265–67 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 43–57 and accompanying text. 
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view, general common law, as created by federal courts, had intruded into 
Congress’s lawmaking prerogative; such an intrusion was unconstitutional 
because Congress had not authorized such judicial lawmaking.300  The 
separation of powers argument suggests that even if Congress has certain 
lawmaking powers that can trump state law, the judiciary’s lawmaking 
authority is far narrower.301 
Despite the increasing prevalence and acceptance of the separation of 
powers arguments, recent scholarship levels cogent criticisms against it.  
First, Erie itself did not make this argument.302  Indeed, on the same day 
that the Supreme Court decided Erie, it created federal common law (in a 
decision authored by Justice Brandeis, no less).303  Any separation of 
powers concerns would have been the same in both cases, thus suggesting 
that Erie’s principal concern was federalism.304  Second, and relatedly, 
those who adhere to the separation of powers rationale have to figure out a 
way to differentiate between prohibited common law adjudication, on the 
one hand, and other permissible judicial actions, on the other hand.305  
Despite an extensive literature discussing such problems, they remain 
largely unresolved.306 
Most importantly, even if the separation of powers rationale is accurate, 
it does not prohibit Congress from tweaking or overhauling the current Erie 
doctrine.  The purported problem with pre-Erie federal common law was 
that federal courts had exercised certain authority absent congressional 
authorization.307  But by that logic, as proponents of the separation of 
powers rationale recognize, Congress could authorize courts to create 
federal common law.308  Indeed, based on the cooperative vision of 
separation of powers espoused by Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in 
the Steel Seizure case,309 Professor Craig Green has argued that federal 
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courts should have the utmost latitude when Congress expressly approves 
the creation of common law.310 
c.  Congress’s Power over Nonsubstantive Rules 
The careful and imaginative work of recent scholarship has 
demonstrated, to my mind, that the Constitution does not compel Erie’s 
essential prohibition against federal common law.  Even if one rejects those 
arguments, though, there is no valid constitutional objection to the statutory 
fix that I propose. 
The Constitution gives Congress extremely wide power to prescribe rules 
for the federal courts, including rules that have a clear effect on substantive 
rights.  Scholars who defend Erie’s constitutional foundation acknowledge 
that the Constitution at most prohibits federal courts from creating 
unambiguously substantive common law.311  Professor Kevin Clermont has 
made the point eloquently: 
Congress and the federal courts could resolve any doubts in the hard cases 
under current doctrine either way—in favor of federal law or, for that 
matter, in favor of the state law—without substantial fear of 
unconstitutional usurpation or derogation of state or federal powers.  They 
truly are choosing the law.  Congress and the federal courts are largely 
free, as far as constitutional powers go, to rationalize and rework the Erie 
doctrine.312 
Any rule within the vast twilight zone between substance and procedure 
thus falls outside of the purview of Erie itself.  Consequently, Congress 
may grant federal courts much more leeway to promulgate rules as long as 
such rules are not clearly substantive in nature. 
The power to create nonsubstantive rules is more expansive than current 
practice suggests.  It extends to many more issues than Congress has 
addressed or than the Supreme Court, pursuant to the Enabling Act, 
currently may regulate.  Perhaps the most conspicuous example is a statute 
of limitations.  Although a federal limitations provision would be 
sufficiently procedural to pass constitutional muster, such a rule presently 
lies beyond the Court’s rulemaking mandate.313  Furthermore, some 
scholars have argued that in certain contexts, federal courts’ inherent power 
 
 310. See Green, supra note 7, at 655–59. 
 311. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 57, at 1421–22; Ely, supra note 3, at 705; Allan Ides, The 
Supreme Court and the Law To Be Applied in Diversity Cases:  A Critical Guide to the 
Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems, 163 F.R.D. 19, 77 
(1995); Rowe, supra note 10, at 977; see also Redish, supra note 4, at 801. 
 312. Clermont, supra note 42, at 997–98. 
 313. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 210, at 1019–20; Ely, supra note 3, at 726; Rowe, 
supra note 10, at 973. But see Paul D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the 
Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281, 307–09 (arguing that the Enabling Act already 
permits the Supreme Court to create a limitations provision). 
2014] TOIL AND TROUBLE 3301 
over their own procedure might be even broader than Congress’s authority 
to regulate procedure.314 
The upshot is that no constitutional impediment prevents Congress from 
revising the Erie doctrine to allow federal courts to adopt any rule that falls 
within the twilight zone. 
2.  Is the Distinction Between Substantive and Nonsubstantive Rules  
Any Better Than the Current Regime? 
The statute that I propose continues to rely on a distinction between 
substance and procedure, albeit by drawing the line in a different place than 
do the current sources of the Erie doctrine.  One of the most vexing 
problems with the current doctrine is the uncertainty about which issues fall 
on which side of that line.  Although my proposal will not resolve that 
uncertainty completely, it will mitigate the problem for several reasons. 
First, the current interpretations of the Decision Act and the Enabling Act 
(and, by some accounts, the Constitution) rely on the distinction but locate 
the line of demarcation in slightly different places.  For instance, the Court 
in Shady Grove gave Rule 23 (regarding class actions) a fairly broad 
construction but held that it was sufficiently procedural for Enabling Act 
purposes.315  On the other hand, the current standards of the Decision Act 
probably would regard a broad construction of Rule 23 as substantive 
because it likely would lead to forum shopping.316  The unified approach of 
the proposed statute alleviates this problem by streamlining the analysis, 
requiring courts and litigants to negotiate only one line, rather than the two 
(or possibly three) lines that the current doctrine draws. 
Second, the inherent difficulty with the line that the Enabling Act draws 
between substance and procedure owes to the Court’s failure, especially in 
recent years, to reach a point of clarity about which interests that division 
protects.  The Court has treated the Enabling Act’s restrictions as guardians 
of federalism, even though the Act actually protects separation of powers 
principles.317  Moreover, there always has been some tension in the Court’s 
ability to navigate difficult questions within the twilight zone because the 
Act’s framers generally did not appreciate how many issues do not lend 
themselves to easy classification as either substantive or procedural. 
The proposed statute provides clarity on all of these points by defining 
states’ federalism interests with more precision.  Courts thus can identify 
with greater ease which issues properly fall within states’ lawmaking 
purview and which ones are within the scope of the judiciary’s rulemaking 
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power.  As Professors Cook and Clark recognized,318 the substance-
procedure dichotomy becomes much more administrable once the purpose 
of the division becomes clear.  The proposed statute, unlike the current Erie 
doctrine, makes significant progress in that direction.319 
Finally, my proposal arguably makes courts’ task a bit easier by focusing 
solely on the definition of substantive rights through the lens of conduct 
rules.  Courts’ rulemaking power is simply the mirror image of conduct 
rules and does not rely on any a priori notion of procedure. 
In short, the distinction between substantive and nonsubstantive rules is 
easier to apply than the current doctrine because it streamlines the analysis 
into a single test.  Moreover, it identifies the purpose of such differentiation, 
based on a concrete notion of states’ interests in crafting conduct rules, thus 
making the unified test more coherent. 
3.  Will Greater Judicial Discretion Lead to Overreaching? 
There are good institutional reasons to believe that courts would exercise 
their new authority appropriately.  Justice Antonin Scalia has noted that 
when courts create a new rule in the process of adjudication, that rule 
applies to the case at hand, despite the litigants’ lack of prior notice of the 
new rule.  But the inability to create rules on a purely prospective basis is 
an important “check[] upon judicial lawmaking,” without which courts 
would be “substantially more free to ‘make new law.’”320  In other words, 
the very nature of common law adjudication helps ensure that courts will 
create new nonsubstantive rules interstitially and as a matter of necessity 
rather than sheer will. 
In many instances, courts probably will continue to allow state law to 
operate in a number of contexts over which federal courts would have 
authority.  For instance, even when the Supreme Court asserts the power to 
make substantive or procedural common law, it frequently borrows state 
standards.321  Congress has displayed particular sensitivity to rules of 
evidence, especially state rules governing privilege.  In light of that 
sensitivity, it seems unlikely that federal courts would attempt to flout the 
carefully constructed balance.  Similarly, Congress and courts historically 
have evinced solicitude for states’ ability to define statutes of limitation, 
and it is difficult to imagine that federal courts would assert a special 
interest in such questions. 
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One might wonder whether such humility will cause the proposal to 
unravel.  In other words, will deference to state law raise the same sorts of 
difficult balancing choices that a revised doctrine seeks to avoid?  I do not 
believe so.  First, in the absence of a congressional directive, federal courts’ 
application of state law usually will reflect the courts’ borrowing of state 
law rather than because state law applies of its own force.  Second, and 
relatedly, the federal courts’ decision to borrow state law will not turn on 
myriad competing interests.  Instead, it will stem from a conclusion that the 
federal government does not have an overriding interest in regulating 
particular questions (say, statutes of limitation).  Finally, any decision to 
borrow state law because of a lack of federal interest is conclusive for all 
cases.  No longer will federal courts have to consider states’ potentially 
countervailing interests on a case-by-case basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The Erie doctrine, even after its reformulation in Hanna, never has been 
as stable as some scholars had hoped.  Over the last two decades, the 
Supreme Court has introduced new uncertainty into the doctrine, 
undermining predictability and uniformity, which are among a procedural 
regime’s most prized attributes.  More importantly, a fresh look at the 
modern Erie doctrine reveals that it does not protect coherent notions of 
federalism, separation of powers, or equality.  Despite Erie’s much-repeated 
language about the undesirability of forum shopping, the current doctrine 
does not actually alleviate any impropriety or inherent unfairness. 
I have suggested a statutory revision that reorients the Erie doctrine to 
streamline the analysis and promote a more coherent vision of federalism.  
Giving federal courts a wider berth to adopt nonsubstantive rules, and 
greater discretion as to the means by which they do so, would promote a 
number of important policies.  It simultaneously would protect states’ actual 
federalism interests more robustly and create a more administrable 
procedural regime. 
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APPENDIX A 
Although there are many ways to capture the principles outlined in Part 
III, one potential statutory formulation is below.  Section 1 of the following 
text largely would preserve the current version of the Rules of Decision 
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, and then add a clarification about how it applies in 
diversity cases.  Section 2 would replace 28 U.S.C. § 2072 of the Rules 
Enabling Act. 
*  *  * 
Section 1. Rules of Decision. 
(a) The laws of the respective states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts 
of the United States, in cases where they apply. 
(b) In any civil action over which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction founded on section 1332 of this title, the substantive law of the 
appropriate state or states shall provide the rules of decision. 
 
Section 2. Power To Prescribe Nonsubstantive Rules. 
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general 
nonsubstantive rules for cases in the United States district courts (including 
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals. 
(b) The Supreme Court, the United States courts of appeals, and the 
United States district courts, when adjudicating cases over which they have 
jurisdiction, shall have the power to adopt general nonsubstantive rules, as 
necessary, that are not inconsistent with rules adopted pursuant to 
subsection (a) of this section and relevant sections of this chapter.  Such 
rules, when adopted by the Supreme Court, shall have the same force and 
effect as rules adopted pursuant to subsection (a). 
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the 
purposes of appeal under section 1291 of this title. 
*  *  * 
Section 1(a) essentially preserves the current Decision Act in order not to 
upset the broader Erie megadoctrine, which covers a range of issues, 
including exactly which law should apply when state courts apply federal 
substantive law.  Section 1(b) addresses the narrower question of which law 
federal courts should apply when they are sitting in diversity.  It codifies the 
basic holding of Erie that a federal court sitting in diversity must apply state 
substantive law.  That is the core of Erie, and regardless of whether one 
regards it as constitutionally compelled, it embodies important federalism 
principles, as discussed in Part III.B of the Article.  Section 1(b) makes 
clear, though, that federal courts are required to apply only truly substantive 
state law.  It thereby eliminates the twin aims analysis that the Supreme 
Court has treated as the touchstone of the current Decision Act.  As a side 
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benefit, section 1 also removes a minor cloud of uncertainty about the 
Decision Act and clarifies that it indeed calls for application of state law in 
diversity cases.322 
Section 2(a) leaves in place the basic structure by which the Supreme 
Court, through the formal rulemaking process,323 may create general 
prospective rules of practice and procedure for the federal courts.  It 
replaces the language of the current Enabling Act, which allows the 
Supreme Court “to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure,” 
subject to the proviso that “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify 
any substantive right.”324  In light of the prevailing uncertainty about the 
extent to which the italicized language of these clauses should interact, 
section 2(a) instead creates a single standard, permitting the Court to 
promulgate “general nonsubstantive rules.”  The concept that such rules 
should regulate practice and procedure remains the same, but the change in 
language clarifies that any rule adopted for a procedural purpose is valid 
even if it has a collateral substantive effect. 
Section 2(b) essentially gives courts the power to create rules 
interstitially in the process of adjudication.  It is a delegation of common 
law–making power to the federal courts that is coextensive with the 
Supreme Court’s formal rulemaking power under section 2(a).  The phrase 
“as necessary” seeks to ensure that courts exercise the power interstitially 
and, in general, defer to the formal rulemaking process.  In essence, section 
2 gives the Supreme Court discretion to promulgate rules formally, to adopt 
them through adjudication, or to leave certain rules within the discretion of 
the lower courts.325 
Finally, section 2(c) preserves what is currently 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) in 
order to make clear that the appeals statute does not preempt the rulemaking 
authority contemplated by section 2(a) and (b). 
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